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Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying 
Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic 
Violence 
Tamara L. Kuennen 
ABSTRACT 
This Article maps out a new theoretical critique of no-drop 
prosecution policies, the criminal justice system’s predominant approach 
to domestic violence. No-drop rules compel prosecutors to make decisions 
about whether to pursue charges against a batterer without regard to 
the victim’s wishes. When the law mandates this approach, it not only 
enforces the criminal law, but also effectively terminates the relationship 
between the victim and her partner. This blunt response to what is often 
a complex situation indiscriminately dispenses with the many reasons a 
victim may want or need to preserve her intimate relationship.  
While numerous scholars have grappled with the issue of no-drop 
prosecutions, with few exceptions, the body of academic literature has 
neglected to fully consider the norms and values associated with the 
intimate relationship between the victim and batterer, and between the 
victim and other communities. This Article introduces an original 
perspective to this scholarly discourse that draws from a source that at 
first seems completely unconnected to domestic violence—Relational 
Contract Theory (“RCT”). RCT has been employed to criticize 
substantive contract law by arguing that the law ought to analyze a 
discrete, legally significant incident (e.g., a breach) in the context of the 
ongoing relationship between the parties. It suggests that for the law to 
understand any single incident—let alone design an effective remedy 
for it—it must assess the significance of the multiple and complex 
human relations that surround the incident. Drawing on that 
perspective, the Article contends that states’ decisions about whether to 
prosecute would be enhanced by permitting prosecutors to look at discrete 
incidents of domestic violence with a more nuanced assessment of the 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. I am 
grateful for the many comments of Stewart Macaulay, Jay Feinman, Ethan Leib, Alan Chen, 
Kris Miccio, Laura Rovner, and Christine Cimini, and to the invaluable research assistance of 
Ryann Love, Anthony Barbe, and Gabe Dusenbury. 
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parties’ relational values rather than unilaterally tossing aside those 
important considerations. 
The Article begins by documenting the evolution of the no-drop 
prosecution rule, and surveys the debate amongst feminist legal scholars 
with regard to the values and limits of no-drop. This section of the 
article concludes that scholars have not sufficiently considered the 
importance of the relation. Next, the Article discusses the methodology of 
RCT and models how it could be applied to the prosecutorial decision-
making process in domestic violence cases. Viewing the relationship 
underlying the incident of violence as an exchange, and applying the 
relational method to that exchange, brings into focus all that a victim 
gets from the relationship and all that she loses by leaving it. The Article 
anticipates and addresses resistance to incorporating relational values 
into domestic violence law. It also responds to the fear that importing 
relational principles to this context will mean a return to an era in 
which the state treats domestic violence as a private, relationship 
problem rather than a crime. It suggests instead that there is room 
between the current no-drop regime and the “always-drop” policy of the 
past to address the relational values of victims. The Article concludes by 
demonstrating how the application of relational principles to domestic 
violence prosecution may, in fact, advance feminist values.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
When prosecutors follow the no-drop prosecution rule1—the 
criminal justice system’s predominant response to domestic 
violence—they not only enforce a criminal law, but also effectively 
terminate the relationship between the victim and her partner.2 Both 
our current legal regime and our social prejudices suggest that 
ending this relationship is the only desirable outcome.3 This blunt 
response to what is often a complex situation fails to take into 
account the many reasons why couples involved in domestic violence 
incidents may want to nonetheless preserve their relationships.4 
 
 1. “No-drop” refers to an amalgam of policies that limit a prosecutor’s discretion to 
drop domestic violence cases based solely on the victim's request and that consequently limit 
the victim's ability to withdraw a complaint. A concept related to the no-drop rule is 
“victimless” prosecution. See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 2. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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While feminist and other scholars have long debated the values 
and limits of the no-drop prosecution rule, the conversation has been 
limited mostly to weighing only two distinct interests: safety and 
autonomy. Those who support no-drop prosecution and other 
devices that remove decision makers’ discretion in domestic violence 
(“DV”) cases argue that women are safer under such a rule because 
it prioritizes punishing and deterring the batterer over any other 
consideration.5 Feminists who oppose no-drop rules contend that 
the legal regime’s enforcement of criminal statutes without regard to 
victims’ wishes undermines their autonomy, which is a paternalistic 
and disempowering policy.6 With few exceptions, scholars on both 
sides of this discourse have not assessed no-drop prosecution in light 
of the norms and values associated with the intimate relationship 
between the victim and batterer. In this Article, I introduce a new 
perspective to the scholarly debate by drawing from a source that at 
first seems completely unconnected to DV—Relational Contract 
Theory (“RCT”). 
I argue that DV law has much to learn from RCT. RCT makes 
the case that for the law to understand any single incident—let alone 
design an effective legal remedy for it—it must closely examine the 
multiple and complex human relations that surround the incident.7 
When those relations are not particularly significant, treating the 
parties like arm’s-length transactors (in contract) or like strangers (in 
DV prosecution) by evaluating the discrete incident alone may 
suffice.8 The more intertwined the parties, however, the more the 
norms and values surrounding their relations govern the parties’ 
behaviors.9 Consequently, the law must account for those norms and 
values. To the extent that it does not, the law becomes “empirically 
 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 6. Id. 
 7. James W. Fox, Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“[R]elational contract theories force us to look outside doctrine 
and toward the world of contract actually practiced; they ask us to think very seriously about 
the world of human relations surrounding what we tend to think of as the legal contract.”).  
 8.  RCT does not suggest that a relational approach is necessary in all cases. In some 
cases, where relations do not significantly affect the transaction, a transactional analysis will 
suffice. However, RCT suggests that there are very few transactions that are not affected by the 
relations within which they occur. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
 9. See id.  
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irrelevant” and “incoherent,” in the words of Ian Macneil, founder 
of RCT.10 
One may wonder how examining a private, contractual theory 
contributes to a debate about how the criminal justice system should 
respond to DV. First, it conceptualizes the underlying intimate 
relationship as an “exchange relation,” bringing into focus all that a 
victim gets from the relationship, and all that she has to lose by 
leaving it. I apply the foundational principles of RCT to DV law, and 
argue both that a victim’s relational values should be critical to the 
criminal prosecution of DV, and that RCT provides a method for 
determining what those values are and how significantly they impact 
what the current legal regime deems a successful solution to DV: 
severing the intimate relationship. In the same way that RCT has 
been an important perspective from which to criticize substantive 
contract law, the relational perspective can be a valuable lens through 
which to critique the current legal regime governing DV law.  
Second, analogizing to a private, contractual theory abstracts the 
legal response from the political tensions of the feminist debate. The 
debate is understandably animated by the fear of losing ground in 
activists’ hard-won fight for state intervention in DV.11 By applying 
RCT to DV, my goal is to compel a reexamination, freed of the 
political constraints of the current debate, of the wisdom of a legal 
approach that ignores relational values.12 
 
 10. IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF 
IAN MACNEIL 9 (David Campbell ed., 2001).  
 11. See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657 (2004) (warning that the divide amongst 
feminists with regard to aggressive state interventions threatens the ground gained). Christine 
Littleton called this a problem of transition. Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the 
Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 51 
(“Often it appears as if feminist questioning of the [law’s] impulse toward separation should at 
least wait until women can count on the law allowing them to separate.”). For further 
discussion of the problem of transition, see discussion infra Part V.A.  
 12. For an example and discussion of the value of interdisciplinary work in which 
principles of one body of law have been applied to another, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, 
Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 152–53 & n.194 (2003) (contrasting treatment 
of minority races in constitutional jurisprudence with treatment of minority shareholders in 
corporate law, and discussing the value of transferring theory, practice, and technology across 
legal domains). Particularly with regard to domestic violence, see, for example, CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 261–74 
(2006) (comparing international war crime of violence against women with domestic law crime 
of violence against women); Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons 
from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999) (examining theoretical possibilities of 
Najavjo Peacemaking, an informal adjudicative model, outside of the Navajo locale); Bonita C. 
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I argue that in cases where the relational values tell us that 
separation is unlikely, because the victim wants or needs to preserve 
her relationship, a successful outcome should be re-defined to mean 
keeping her safer while in her relationship. RCT is particularly 
valuable in this endeavor. It is concerned with the creation and 
restraint of power in relations, and explicitly understands the law as a 
source of power. In the context of DV, victims would use the law to 
regain control in their relationships. The law, and particularly the 
threat of criminal prosecution, can be a substantial bargaining chip 
for victims if they can both threaten to use it and withdraw their 
threats when their partners comply with their demands.13 No-drop 
policies do not provide this option. 
By analogizing DV to RCT, I do not suggest that an incident of 
DV should be analyzed as a breach of contract, nor do I suggest that 
a relationship in which DV takes place be viewed as a purely private, 
contractual matter. My purpose is to examine how another body of 
law has addressed the problems posed by a discrete incident 
occurring within an ongoing, complex relationship. I conclude that 
importing some fundamental principles of RCT into prosecutorial 
decision-making policy avoids dispensing with norms such as love, 
harmony, and privacy that—outside of the context of DV—the law 
fosters.  
Examining a different way to approach DV prosecution is 
particularly timely. In the past several years, the Supreme Court 
issued three decisions expanding a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights to confront his or her accuser.14 These decisions will have a 
significant impact on DV prosecution because prosecutors now need 
to urge victims to testify, even in circumstances where victims do not 
want to pursue the charges. 
This Article presents the case for consideration of relational 
values in the following manner. Part II documents the current 
regime’s response to DV, explaining both what the state does and 
 
Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371 
(2003) (comparing the international law definition of torture to the domestic law definition of 
domestic violence).  
 13. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 14. These are Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006), and Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008), discussed infra Part V.A. 
As a result of these holdings, prosecutors are likely to redouble their efforts to persuade victims 
to testify at trial. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic 
Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711 (2009).  
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
520 
why it does it. It then describes the ways in which the state’s 
intervention impacts the private lives and relationships of victimsand 
the debate in the literature with regard to the cost of this 
intervention to victim decision-making autonomy. Part III answers 
the question “Why Apply RCT to DV?” by first setting forth the 
overarching principles of the theory. It then illustrates how—outside 
of the context of no-drop prosecution—DV scholars argue in 
support of importing relational values into DV law. This section 
concludes by identifying and addressing a critique of the analogy 
between RCT and DV—that RCT applies to parties who have 
relatively equal power. I interpret RCT to be particularly concerned 
with exchanges involving unequal power, and argue that this makes 
RCT relevant in the context of DV.  
In Part IV, I describe the methodology of RCT as it applies to 
exchange relations, and then discuss its value in the context of a 
particular DV case. I illustrate how viewing the underlying intimate 
relation as an exchange relation, and applying the relational method, 
enriches both prosecutorial decision making and the scholarly 
discussion surrounding no-drop policies. I conclude this section by 
addressing critics’ potential normative arguments against importing 
relational values into DV prosecutorial policy. 
Finally, Part V addresses the political problem for battered 
women’s activists: the fear of returning to an era in which the state 
treats DV as a relationship problem rather than a crime. I argue here 
that the application of RCT provides an opportunity to implement 
feminist values in prosecutorial policy. RCT normalizes rather than 
pathologizes the desire to preserve relationships in the context of 
DV. It values people’s actual experiences in the world, and holds that 
law should reflect these considerations. RCT understands that liberal 
notions of autonomy, upon which both contract and DV law are 
built, do not account for the web of interdependencies that are the 
reality of life. Many feminist legal scholars have long argued that all 
of these values should infuse law and policy. I argue that applying 
relational principles to DV prosecution is a step toward that goal.  
II. NO-DROP PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
This Part describes the current criminal justice approach to DV. 
It begins by discussing the goals of battered women’s activists in the 
1960s and 1970s who lobbied for legal reforms requiring the 
criminal justice system to respond to DV as zealously as it would to 
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crimes of violence between strangers.15 It then illuminates an 
unintended consequence of these reforms—the legal system’s 
emphasis on termination of the intimate relationship as a solution to 
DV—and explains the many reasons victims may need or choose to 
preserve their relationships rather than sever them. It then turns to 
the debate in the scholarly literature. Both proponents and 
opponents of aggressive, mandatory criminal justice reforms 
acknowledge that a victim’s autonomy is diminished. However, the 
autonomy of which they speak is the autonomy to make decisions 
that further one’s safety. Neither side of this debate pays enough 
attention to the autonomy to make decisions about one’s intimate 
relations and private life. As I will later argue, this type of autonomy 
is critical to victims, and therefore should be critical in prosecutorial 
decision making and the scholarly debate about it. 
A. The Transformation of DV from a “Relationship Problem” to a 
Crime 
Prior to the battered women’s movement of the 1960s and 
1970s, the criminal justice system treated DV as a private matter in 
which it had no business interfering.16 Battered women’s activists 
sought to change this perception.17 They wanted DV to be treated as 
 
 15. See infra notes 18–19. 
 16. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES 
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 157–58 (1982). See generally Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1990). But see Donna Coker, 
Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 131–32 (Heather Strung & John Braithwaite 
eds., 2002) (arguing that it is inaccurate to describe the state’s response to domestic violence 
as a unified refusal to intervene in private family matters when there has been little objection to 
major state intervention when domestic violence is viewed as a race or class issue; in that case, 
the lives of poor women and women of color have been traditionally under-privatized). 
 17. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13 
(2000) (“In the 1960s, with the rebirth of an active women’s movement in the United States, 
feminists again began to challenge this concept of family privacy; the new consciousness 
created by these efforts provided an arena in which hidden ‘private’ violence became more and 
more visible.”); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
191 (1989) (“Why a person would ‘allow’ force in private (the ‘why doesn’t she leave’ 
question raised to battered women) is a question given its insult by the social meaning of the 
private as a sphere of choice. . . . This is why feminism has had to explode the private. This is 
why feminism has seen the personal as the political.”). For a recent description of liberal and 
radical feminists’ deconstruction of privacy in the context of domestic violence, see Suzanne A. 
Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 569–83 (2006). 
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seriously as a crime of violence between strangers.18 The 
criminalization of DV was one piece of a larger political strategy 
designed to change cultural attitudes about violence against 
women.19  
At the beginning of the battered women’s movement, police did 
not routinely respond to reports of abuse.20 When they did respond, 
they avoided making arrests.21 Instead, they counseled, mediated, 
and helped the suspect “cool off.”22 Battered women recounted 
stories of police choosing not to arrest, even though perpetrators 
were still assaulting them when officers arrived at the scene.23  
 
 18. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 184 (describing the historic rationale for 
criminalization of domestic violence as “a clear statement that assault in intimate relationships 
will be treated the same as assault by strangers”). But see id. at 182 (describing how feminist 
activists have always been and continue to be deeply divided regarding the appropriateness of 
criminalization).  
 19. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 265 (2005) 
(“Criminalization, as envisioned by advocates in the 1970s and 1980s, was strategic. The 
institution of mandatory practices, specifically arrest, was perceived as the first step in a process 
that would lead to a seismic cultural change by inscribing women’s empowerment, individual 
and collective accountability, and conceptions of equality upon the cultural landscape.”).  
 20. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 158 (“At the beginning of the movement, battered 
women complained frequently that the police simply would not come when called.”); Miccio, 
supra note 19, at 274 (“Police arrest avoidance was the rule rather than the exception.”); id. at 
283 (describing the testimony of witnesses at the 1978 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
hearings regarding police arrest avoidance). 
 21. See LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A 
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 90, 95–
105 (2008) (arguing that those involved in the domestic violence movement must understand 
the importance of a victim’s relationships and community ties); SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 
159–60 (describing class action lawsuits brought by battered women in Oakland and in New 
York for failure to arrest); Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia L. Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: “Catch 
22” Revisited, 3 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 138, 156 (“Once inside the home, the officer’s sole 
purpose is to preserve the peace[,] . . . attempt to soothe feelings, pacify parties . . . [and] 
suggest parties refer their problem to a church or a community agency. . . . In dealing with 
family disputes the power of arrest should be exercised as a last resort.”).  
 22. See SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 157, 161 (describing police being trained to 
mediate, rather than arrest); Miccio, supra note 19, at 269 (“Police would routinely separate 
the parties, take the assailant on the proverbial walk around the block, and permit him to 
return home with barely a slap on the wrist.”). 
 23. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 160 (“One plaintiff’s deposition stated that the 
police refused to arrest her husband even though he was still hitting her when they arrived and 
they had to pry his hands from around her neck.”); Miccio, supra note 19, at 300 & n.275 
(describing how in the 1970s and 1980s police refused to arrest even when they witnessed 
assaults, believing the assaults to be private matters); Sack, supra note 11, at 1690 (recalling 
when police watched a victim being beaten and did nothing in response). 
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Activists identified two problems in need of resolution.24 First, 
they argued that, when given discretion, police would not arrest at 
all.25 As a result of their law reform efforts, today many states’ 
statutes do not merely authorize, but explicitly encourage and even 
require arrest.26 Similarly, most states mandate police to arrest when 
they have probable cause to believe a violation of a DV restraining 
order has occurred.27  
Second, activists argued that police viewed assaults that occurred 
in the home as less serious than assaults that occurred between 
strangers.28 If an incident was viewed as a misdemeanor rather than a 
felony, police could not make an arrest at the scene without a 
warrant.29 Thus, activists lobbied for the expansion of arrest powers 
so that, in DV cases, police could arrest without a warrant for 
misdemeanor (not just felony) offenses.30 Today, laws in forty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia authorize police to make 
warrantless arrests in DV cases.31  
Like police, prosecutors also viewed DV as a relationship 
problem rather than a crime.32  
 
 24. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 159 (describing battered women’s movement goals 
as (1) seeing that “wife beating was treated as a crime” by both working with the police to 
enforce the already existing laws and (2) by expanding police power to arrest). 
 25. See id. at 158, 160.  
 26. See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but 
Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 191, 215 n.110 (2008) (recently 
compiling these statutes). In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”), authorizing the Attorney General to make funding available to jurisdictions that 
implemented pro-arrest and mandatory-arrest policies. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh (2008). 
 27. See Miccio, supra note 19, at 237 n.2 (compiling statutes that mandate arrest when 
there is probable cause to believe that a violation of a protection order has occurred). 
 28. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 159. 
 29. Id. (citing DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 90 (1976)). 
 30. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 159 (“As one lawyer noted, ‘in battered women’s 
cases, the police tend to view serious cases as misdemeanors rather than felonies so you must 
specify in legislation that the police may arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor 
offense.’”). 
 31. See Kohn, supra note 26, at 214 n.109 (compiling and describing states’ statutes). 
 32. See  Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN 
BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 96 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (explaining that 
prosecutors failed to proceed in domestic violence cases because they believed battering was a 
minor dispute or a private family matter); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s 
Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 
267, 299–302 (1985) (describing family privacy as one of the many reasons that the legal 
system used to justify non-intervention);  Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor 
Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47–48, 52–53 (1992). 
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Badly beaten women, desperate for protection, often saw charges 
reduced or dismissed by prosecutors and heard attorneys and 
judges alike recommend counseling or mediation. The constant 
taunts: “You don’t want to lock him up; he’ll lose his job; your kids 
need a father,” greeted battered women who tried to prosecute. 
Prosecutors considered these cases a bother, demanding proof of 
severe injury, promises to follow through, and “character” checks 
to verify battered women’s credibility as witnesses. Like rape 
victims, battered women often felt like the criminal.33 
In addition to viewing DV as a relationship problem rather than 
a crime, another reason prosecutors dropped cases was because the 
victim either explicitly requested them to do so or she otherwise did 
not cooperate with the prosecutor.34 Some activists believed 
prosecutors used victim non-cooperation as an excuse to drop,35 
while others worried that victims’ explicit or implicit reluctance to 
prosecute was due to intimidation or threats by the batterer.36 
To correct prosecutors’ historic failure to initiate charges and 
follow through with prosecution in DV cases,37 many battered 
women’s activists argued that prosecutors’ discretion to act, like that 
 
 33. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 166. 
 34. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1861 & n.41 (1996); Deborah Epstein, 
Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1843, 1857 (2002) (explaining district attorneys’ reluctance to waste time and resources 
on domestic violence cases in which victims typically did not follow through); Kohn, supra 
note 26, at n.150 (reviewing statistics gathered in the “early days” of no-drop prosecution, 
showing percentages of cases dropped and victims who purportedly wanted to drop).  
 35. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 175 (describing some activists’ views that victim 
non-cooperation was merely a rationalization for not proceeding with cases). 
 36. Id. It is worth noting here that this discussion implies that the victim, rather than 
the prosecutor, has the power to make the decision to dismiss or go forward with a charge. 
Only the prosecutor can determine whether to go forward with or “drop” a case. But as will be 
discussed infra, the term “drop” is commonly used in the literature to describe the victim’s 
desire for the prosecutor to go forward with or “drop” a case. See MICHELLE MADDEN 
DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 14, 17 n.61 
(2009) (explaining that victims ask, rather than officially decide, to drop and describing “no-
drop” as a misnomer in the literature). 
 37. For discussion of prosecutors’ failure to initiate and follow through with charges, see 
R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 146 
(1992); Laura Dugan, Domestic Violence Legislation: Exploring Its Impact on the Likelihood of 
Domestic Violence, Police Involvement, and Arrest, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 283, 302 
(2003); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the 
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 15 (1999); 
Hanna, supra note 34, at 1857.  
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of police, should be curtailed.38 The state should, some activists 
argued,39 prosecute it at the same rate and in the same manner as 
violence between strangers.40 To achieve this formal equality, 
prosecutors must file and pursue charges based solely on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, like in any other case.41 Limiting 
prosecutorial discretion in this manner would at once prevent 
prosecutors from using victim non-cooperation as an excuse to drop 
cases and it would discourage batterers from coercing victims to 
drop cases.42  
This kind of policy was initially referred to as “no-drop”43 or 
“mandatory”44 prosecution. More recently it has been referred to as 
 
 38. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 184–86 (discussing activists’ arguments in support of 
no-drop); Miccio, supra note 19, at 265–66 (describing many feminists’ view of no-drop 
policies as a “necessary prophylactic”); Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An 
Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 53 
(2000) (describing activists’ arguments in support of less discretion).  
 39. Not all battered women’s activists were supportive of the criminalization strategy. 
Many expressed serious concerns about working with the criminal justice system because they 
identified the state as a source of women’s oppression and subordination. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 17, at 184 (“Historically, criminalizing domestic violence has been a strategy 
dogged by controversy. Because the state has been deficient in protecting women from abuse 
in the past, feminists have been wary of using state mechanisms to intervene on behalf of 
battered women.”); see also Miccio, supra note 19, at 266–67 (“Because mandatory practices 
first evolved as a political strategy, the discourse among feminists has been marked by 
reluctance and anxiety concerning interaction with the state. This anxiety reflects more than 
ambivalence; it reveals the distrust that feminists hold for law enforcement. . . . [T]he anxiety 
associated with mandatory arrest and prosecution is emblematic of the paradox inherent in 
working with systems that have been the sources of the problem.”).  
 40. Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 
81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1996) (describing the legal treatment of domestic violence 
over the past decade as mirroring the “evolving consciousness . . . that men who beat their 
wives should be given the same legal treatment as men who beat their neighbors” and a belief 
that “the criminal justice system should act unequivocally to protect a battered woman from 
her abuser and that the threat of incarceration will deter future perpetrators from violence”).  
 41. But see MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 179 (arguing that although the call for 
law enforcement to treat domestic violence like any other crime has been used to support no-
drop policies, in actuality “victim cooperation is widely taken as sufficient grounds for dismissal 
in the vast majority of generic assault” cases).  
 42. See generally Hanna, supra note 34, at 1852 (describing how a batterer’s threats to 
intimidate or dissuade a victim would be pointless); id. at 1854 (arguing that aggressive 
criminal prosecution would be one way to “make the criminal justice system more responsive 
to crimes that predominantly affect female victims”). 
 43. The term “no-drop” represents an amalgam of policies, from “hard” no-drop, in 
which a case proceeds regardless of the victim’s wishes, including sanctioning her should she 
refuse to participate, to “soft” no-drop policies, in which prosecutors do not force, but 
encourage victims to participate. See id. at 1863.  
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“victimless” or “evidence-based” prosecution.45 While there is no 
single nationwide survey of existing DV prosecution policies,46 
scholars have reported various iterations of these policies over the 
years,47 and a recent on-line search illustrates that they are in effect in 
many jurisdictions today.48 As a result, the rate of DV prosecutions 
has dramatically increased.49  
 
 44. Hanna coined this term, which she defines as a policy that “can require a woman to 
sign statements; be photographed to document injuries; be interviewed by police, prosecutors, 
or advocates; provide the state with other evidence or information; produce her children if 
subpoenaed; and appear in court throughout the proceedings.” Id. at 1867. 
 45. Though these terms are used interchangeably in the literature, they represent 
markedly different concepts. “No-drop” and “aggressive” prosecution refer to the normative 
proposition that the state should prosecute the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence, 
regardless of the victim’s desire. “Victimless” and “evidence-based” prosecution refer to a 
strategy or method for how the state can proceed with the case, without the victim’s 
cooperation. See MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 15–16, 21. Whether the state should 
versus whether it can prosecute DV are distinct questions that are at times conflated. See id. at 
15. See also Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the 
Sound of Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing victimless prosecution as a method of 
prosecuting cases that is often used indiscriminately, without attention to the “should” 
question).  
 46. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1863; Telephone interview with Kristina Marie Korobov, 
Senior Attorney, National Center for Prosecution of Violence Against Women, National 
District Attorney Association (Apr. 2, 2009) (notes on file with author).  
 47. See Kohn, supra note 26, at 219 (noting that “[i]n many states, prosecution policies 
mandate that the state intervene in domestic violence cases and minimize the impact of victims’ 
preferences” and describing no-drop prosecution as “the prime example of this type of 
mandatory intervention protocol”). Examples of no-drop are cited in ANDREW R. KLEIN, 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH, FINAL REPORT 45 
(Apr. 2008) (compiling reports from National Institute of Justice funded studies on no-drop 
prosecution); Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey 
of Large Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 180, 181–82 
(Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (commenting on national mail survey 
developed by American Prosecutors Research Institute directed to 200 prosecutors’ offices; 85 
responded to the question of how to proceed when the victim is uncooperative and, of these, 
80 percent stated that they would proceed with the prosecution of the case). Cheryl Hanna, 
The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998) (discussing jurisdictions with aggressive no-drop policies); Sack, 
supra note 11, at 1672 & n.75 (listing some, but not all, jurisdictions that have implemented 
no-drop prosecution policies); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 
(2006) (“A decision to effectively end a relationship is initiated by the prosecutor on behalf of 
the state, adjudicated as a criminal matter, and criminally enforced. It becomes an extension of 
the imperative to treat DV as a crime.”).  
 48. See infra App. I.  
 49. Kohn, supra note 26, at 225, 237 (“[N]o-drop prosecution policies have generally 
increased the percentage of cases charged and decreased the percentage dismissed . . . .”); 
Epstein, supra note 37, at 1858 (noting that in Washington, D.C., the conviction rates for 
stranger and domestic violence cases were virtually the same after the implementation of no-
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B. The Law Presumes Separation is the Solution 
The arrest and prosecution of DV on a scale similar to the arrest 
and prosecution of stranger violence has effected what some 
commentators have called a sea change in the state’s approach to 
DV.50 Through it, many argue, the state has sent a powerful 
symbolic message that it takes DV seriously—as a crime that will not 
be tolerated—rather than as a relationship problem.51  
One unintended effect of the criminalization of DV is the 
criminal justice system’s emphasis on separating perpetrators from 
victims as a solution to DV.52 Separation is accomplished not only via 
arrest, prosecution, and in some cases incarceration,53 but also 
through a relatively newer phenomenon: the widespread issuance of 
criminal restraining (or protection) orders.54  
 
drop and victimless prosecution); BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF EFFORTS TO 
IMPLEMENT NO-DROP POLICIES: TWO CENTRAL VALUES IN CONFLICT 47 (2001) (evaluating 
no-drop policies in four sites: San Diego, California; Omaha, Nebraska; Everett, Washington; 
and Klamath Falls, Oregon, and observing the increase in prosecution rates). 
 50. Bailey, supra note 45, at 8; Epstein, supra note 37, at 14. 
 51. This “expressive value” is the most widely recognized value of no-drop policies 
discussed in the literature. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 162. 
 52. See, e.g., DONILEEN LOESKE, THE BATTERED WOMAN AND SHELTERS 20 (1992) 
(“[T]he collective representation of wife abuse leads to the common sense conclusion that a 
woman should leave such a relationship, and this prescription is part of the collective 
representation: A woman experiencing wife abuse must leave her relationship.”); Sally Engle 
Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of Rights, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 
271, 304 (A. Sarat & T. Kearns eds., 1995) (arguing that the price women pay for going to 
court is separation; law expects women to sever connections with violent men); Sally F. 
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the 
Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2008) (“The 
cumulative effect of these [mandatory] reforms was a transformation of legal policy from the 
assumption that battered women should stay to the assumption they should leave.”); Leigh 
Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal 
Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004) (“[A]lmost all of 
these legal interventions are premised on the notion that battered women want to end their 
relationships, invoke the power of the legal system to keep their batterers away, and ultimately 
sever all legal ties with their abusers.”); Miccio, supra note 19, at 307 (“Both law and popular 
culture equate existence of violence with separation from the relationship . . . .”); Suk, supra 
note 47, at 59.  
 53. Miccio, supra note 19, at 290 (describing the solution for male intimate violence as 
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of offenders) (citation omitted). 
 54. Kohn, supra note 26, at n.134 (compiling a list of state statutes and protocols); see 
also Lisa G. Lerman, Criminal Prosecution of Wife Beaters, 4 RESP. TO VIOLENCE FAM. 1, 19 
(1981) (“To reduce case attrition, prosecutors should adopt a policy that once charges have 
been filed in spouse abuse cases, a victim’s request for dismissal will be denied unless there are 
exceptional circumstances.”). See generally Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact 
Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1999). 
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A criminal protection order prohibits the defendant from having 
any contact with the victim.55 Typically it is issued as a condition of 
the defendant’s pre-trial release and remains in effect through final 
disposition of the criminal case.56 As with mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution, in many states victims have no input into the 
state’s decision to issue the order.57  
The purpose of a restraining order in a case that does not involve 
DV is to protect the integrity of the court proceeding by preventing 
the defendant from intimidating the victim. In a DV case, the state’s 
use of the protection order goes far beyond this. Jeannie Suk argues 
that the state, viewing separation as a direct means of stopping 
violence, issues protection orders in lieu of punishment.58 Separation 
is much easier to achieve than punishment.59 Suk describes the 
process by which this is accomplished. The state reduces the charges 
or dismisses them, in exchange for the defendant’s consent to the 
issuance of a protection order. If the protection order is violated, it 
constitutes a fresh crime—one that is far easier to prove than DV 
proper.60 A defendant who contacts a victim, even if invited to do so, 
risks charges.61 Occasionally victims—the parties protected by the 
orders—are criminally charged.62 The result is that, regardless of 
 
 55. O’Connor, supra note 54, at 947. 
 56. Id. at 946–47; Suk, supra note 47, at 48 (describing a typical order as preventing 
contact with the victim and the children, and excluding the defendant from the victim’s home, 
even if it is his home). 
 57. Kohn, supra note 26, at n.134; Suk, supra note 47, at 48 (“Ascertaining whether 
the victim wants the order is not part of the mandatory protocol. The prosecutor generally 
requests a full stay-away order even if the victim does not want it.”(citations omitted)). 
 58. Suk, supra note 47, at 53 (“Court-ordered separation becomes a goal of prosecutors 
in bringing criminal charges—a substitute for, rather than a means of, increasing the likelihood 
of imprisonment. Punishment as a goal can be put on the backburner because separation is a 
more direct and achievable way to stop or prevent violence.”). 
 59. See id. at 18–19 (suggesting that obtaining a protection order is much easier than 
proving domestic violence).  
 60. Id. at 56. 
 61. Id. (“Even a phone call, letter, or e-mail risks arrest and criminal charges.”). 
 62. See, for example, Iowa’s Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse, at the bottom of 
which the following statement appears: “I . . . understand that I could be arrested and jailed 
for aiding and abetting defendant’s violation of the protective order.” 
http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfdata/frame3233-1389/petition_for_relief.pdf. For examples 
of victims held responsible for the restrained party’s violation of the protection order, see 
Goodmark, supra note 52, at 25 (describing protection order cases in Kentucky, Indiana, and 
Ohio in which women are held in contempt of court for contacting the restrained parties, and 
describing this practice as a trend that is spreading); cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 261 
(“Several states, including Maine and Minnesota, confirm by statute what has become the 
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whether the perpetrator and victim are formally married, it is 
criminal for them to continue in their relationship.63  
Intuition and common sense tell us that DV victims would be 
safer if they left their abusive partners. Statistics paint a very different 
picture. DV victims are at great risk of serious physical abuse after 
they separate from their perpetrators,64 and run the greatest risk of 
being killed during the separation stage.65 In 1991, Martha Mahoney 
named this violence “separation assault”66 and defined it as “a 
specific type of attack that occurs at or after the moment [the victim] 
decides on a separation or begins to prepare for one.”67 Empirical 
data supports Mahoney’s theory.68  
Despite separation assault and post-separation violence statistics, 
legal actors (judges, lawyers, and court personnel) presume that 
 
working understanding in many jurisdictions, that a petitioner cannot be found in violation of 
her own order, even if she invites the defendant to ignore its terms.” (citations omitted)).  
 63. See Suk, supra note 47, at 53. 
 64. See, e.g., Callie Marie Rennison & Sarah Welchans, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Intimate 
Partner Violence 5 (2000) (“[D]ivorced or separated persons were subjected to the highest 
rates of intimate partner victimization . . . . ”); Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: 
Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1115 (1996) 
(“Divorced and separated women report being battered 14 times as often as women still living 
with their abusers, and they account for 75 percent of all battered women killed by their past 
or present male partners.”).  
 65. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, If I Can’t Have You, No One Can, in FEMICIDE: THE 
POLITICS OF WOMAN KILLING 99–113 (J. Radford & D. Russell eds., 1992); Angela Browne 
& Kirk R. Williams, Gender, Intimacy, and Lethal Violence: Trends from 1976 Through 1987, 7 
GENDER & SOC’Y 78, 84–87 (1993). 
 66. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Laura Dugan, Daniel S. Nagin & Richard Rosenfeld, Do Domestic Violence 
Services Save Lives?, 250 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 20, 22 (2003) (reviewing homicide data from 
the Supplementary Homicide Reports of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
between 1976–1996 in forty-eight large urban cities in the United States, finding that when 
women seek arrest warrants they are at most risk of physical danger by the batterer); Renée 
Römkens, Protecting Prosecution: Exploring the Powers of Law in an Intervention Program for 
Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 160, 163 (2006) (summarizing empirical 
data and arguing that “[p]recisely when the victim wishes to withdraw from the relationship, 
the desire to maintain or regain control is prominently at stake for the abusive partner . . . . 
The violence, therefore, often becomes more intense and severe during this period, in a last 
effort to exert control. Fear of escalation and threats of revenge with which many women are 
confronted before and during the period of separation often keep them from breaking off the 
relationship. Women run the greatest risk of being killed by their ex-partners during the 
separation stage. We can conclude that the decision to separate or divorce puts these women in 
the highest risk category for becoming victims of excessive abuse and/or continued stalking, 
menacing, and mental terror by their ex-partners . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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women should leave abusive partners.69 This was not the goal of 
battered women’s activists who sought legal reform; their goal was 
“to end violence and coercion, not to have women leave their 
relationships.”70 
C. Why Separation May Not Be the Solution 
Many victims choose not to separate from their intimate 
partners—even after the criminal justice system has intervened71—
 
 69. Coker, supra note 16, at 135 (describing the presumption in the law that women 
should separate as faulty because it presumes women who leave are safer, and presumes that 
women can leave); Goldfarb, supra note 52, at 1498 (“[A]ctors in the legal system—including 
judges, legislators, prosecutors, and police—increasingly see their role as assisting a battered 
woman to separate from her abuser . . . . Under this new paradigm, every victim should leave 
her abuser, and if she turns to the legal system at all, she should cooperate with its efforts to 
remove her from the relationship.”); Kohn, supra note 26, at 200 (“Most individuals in the 
justice system hope to protect battered women from further violence by seeking to remove 
them from abusive relationships. When confronted with a domestic violence offense, the 
system actor sees a straight-forward scenario: an individual has been beaten by her partner and 
needs protection.”); Littleton, supra note 11, at 53 (“[T]he law assumes that the woman must 
leave the battering relationship.”); Mahoney, supra note 66, at 20 (“Despite the many 
responsibilities and connections of women’s lives, courts and legal scholars widely assume that 
it is a woman’s responsibility to leave the relationship.”).  A recent and widely publicized 
example of the presumption that women should leave abusive relationships appeared in People 
magazine. Commenting on pop star Rihanna’s response to the assault charges pending against 
her boyfriend Chris Brown, a criminal defense attorney stated that many women in her 
position have taken their men back. In his words, “It’s extremely common for a domestic 
violence victim to do what we would call ‘go backward’”. Joey Bartolomeo et al., A Romance 
Gone Wrong, PEOPLE, Mar. 2, 2009, at 47.  
 70. SUSAN SCHECHTER, EXPANDING SOLUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
POVERTY: WHAT BATTERED WOMEN WITH ABUSED CHILDREN NEED FROM THEIR 
ADVOCATES 7 (2000). 
 71. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY 109 (2003) (arguing that given the likelihood 
that people involved in a violent intimate relationship will stay together despite state 
intervention, mandatory arrest is not effective); Christopher R. Frank, Criminal Protection 
Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 
924–25 (1996); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742 n.1 
(2007) (discussing a case that represents an “amalgam of many similar experiences” the author 
had while defending cases in domestic violence court, in which the alleged batterer was being 
prosecuted for domestic violence and in which a criminal protection order was issued while the 
parties lived together; the victim did not want to pursue charges and refused to comply with 
the terms of the no-contact order); Kristen Little et al., Assessing Justice System Response to 
Violence Against Women: A Tool for Law Enforcement, Prosecution and the Courts to Use in 
Developing Effective Responses (1998), available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/Promise/ 
pplaw.htm (discussing the many instances that domestic violence victims stay in relationships 
(information provided under the Link, “Interventions Grounded in an Understanding of 
Violence Against Women”)); Suk, supra note 47, at 61 (arguing that many couples live 
together despite issuance of criminal no contact orders prohibiting the batterer from 
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because of the rational fear that doing so will put them in greater 
danger.72 Other barriers to separation have also been well 
documented.73 Like women in non-violent relationships, a victim 
may be dependent on the relationship for money,74 child care,75 
housing,76 and immigration status.77 She might fear losing custody of 
 
contacting the victim); Zorza, supra note 32, at 67 (reporting that fifty-three percent of 
women plan to reconcile with a batterer in treatment). 
 72. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 61, 144 (1987) (discussing the 
high incidence of further abuse and homicide); Sarah M. Buel, A Lawyer’s Understanding of 
Domestic Violence, 62 TEX. B.J. 936, 937–38 (1999) (arguing that one of the reasons many 
women stay in violent relationships is their reasonable fear that their partners will follow 
through on his threats to hurt her or the children); “Failure to Protect” Working Group, 
Charging Battered Mothers with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 849, 858–59 (2000) (describing how “during and after separation . . . the batterer is 
most likely to stalk, harass and even kill the mother,” and thus women should take batterers’ 
threats seriously in concluding that it is safer in the short term to stay in the relationship). 
 73. See generally Buel, supra note 72; Jinseok Kim & Karen A. Gray, Leave or Stay?: 
Battered Women’s Decision After Intimate Partner Violence, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
1465 (2008); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993); Vera E. 
Mouradian, Women’s Stay-Leave Decisions in Relationships Involving Intimate Partner Violence 
(Wellesley Centers for Women, Working Paper No. 415, 2004).  
 74. See generally Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material 
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2000); see also 
Richard J. Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659, 661–63 
(1976) (arguing that the fewer resources and less power wives had, the more likely they were 
to stay with violent husbands); Barbara J. Hart & Erika A. Sussman, Civil Tort Suits and 
Economic Justice for Battered Women, 4 VICTIM ADVOC. 3, 3 (2004) (arguing that inadequate 
material resources render women more vulnerable to battering, increase batterers’ access to 
women who separate, and are a primary reason why women do not attempt to separate). 
 75. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 77 (“Many women who are battered have little 
money, no child care, no employment; they may be financially . . . dependent on the men who 
batter them . . . .”). 
 76. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L NETWORK TO END 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LOST HOUSING, LOST SAFETY: SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
EXPERIENCE HOUSING DENIALS AND EVICTIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY 2 (2007). The 
report found that domestic violence is a leading cause of homelessness nationally and that, 
among cities surveyed in 2005, fifty percent reported domestic violence as a primary cause of 
local homelessness. Id. Additionally, the report found that victims are frequently evicted  or 
later denied housing because of the domestic violence perpetrated against them. Id. at 3; see 
also Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws to 
Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2008) (discussing housing barriers for victims 
of domestic violence and arguing that application of chronic nuisance codes to victims 
exacerbates these barriers); Naomi Stern & Terri Keeley, The Impact of the Violence Against 
Women Act 2005 (VAWA) on the Housing Rights and Options of Survivors of Domestic and 
Sexual Violence, in THE OFFICE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE LAPTOP UPDATE, 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS’ TECHNICAL OUTREACH PROJECT 1 (Spring 2006). 
 77. See generally Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call 
for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43 (2003). 
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her children to her partner.78 She might feel a sense of economic 
responsibility to the children to maintain their standard of living.79 
She might feel shame and embarrassment and, therefore, be reluctant 
to take a step that would require her to disclose the abuse.80  
She might love her partner. For many women, the violence does 
not define the relationship.81 Rather, it represents the low points.82 
Many victims want the violence, rather than the relationship, to 
end.83  
In addition to its impact on the intimate relationship, a decision 
to separate may impact many related relationships. External 
relationships include those with the partner’s family, friends, and 
colleagues; those with various groups or associations to which the 
couple belongs, such as their neighborhood, church, or social club; 
and those with a larger community, such as an ethnic or immigrant 
group or neighborhood. If the couple has children, a victim may be 
concerned about how a decision to leave impacts the children’s 
relationships with any one or all of these individuals and groups.84 
The criminal justice system’s response to DV ignores this 
intricate, multi-dimensional web of relationships. Outside of the 
context of DV, preserving these relationships is often considered not 
only normal, but laudable. And outside of the context of DV, 
preservation of intimate and family relations is a norm fostered by 
 
 78. Goodmark, supra note 52, at 28. 
 79. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 23. 
 80. Id. at 18 (recounting an interview with a woman who stated, “That session in the 
hospital when I had been married one month, and the nurse came and sat on the bed and said 
she had heard I didn’t care if I went home for Christmas . . . . The truth was, I couldn’t face 
what I was going home to. I instinctively knew it was very bad to lie about this but I couldn’t 
bear to tell the truth. It was too humiliating. I didn’t tell her anything. To my friends, I said I 
fell down. I did not intend to cover for him but for myself . . . for the confusion and 
humiliation . . . for finding myself in this unbelievable position.”). 
 81. Katherine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1461 
(2001) (book review). 
 82. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 16.  
 83. See Baker, supra note 81, at 1471–81 (describing the importance of relationships to 
women who have been battered). Baker also argues that many women want their abusive 
partners to change more than they want the relationship to end. Id. at 1490; see also Littleton, 
supra note 11, at 44–49 (discussing the tremendous value of connection in relationships, even 
when the relationships are violent). According to Littleton, “battered women may stay in 
relationships that are physically dangerous to them because they value connection . . . .” Id. at 
44.  
 84. These and other potential losses will be discussed infra Part IV. 
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law.85 Within the context of DV, however, victims who value 
preservation of their relationships are seen as pathological, 
incapacitated, weak, not credible, and annoying.86  
D. The Scholarly Debate 
No-drop policies have been the subject of an enormous amount 
of debate amongst DV scholars.87 This debate includes, among other 
measures of success,88 whether no-drop has effectively reduced 
recidivism, whether it has increased the number of DV prosecutions, 
and whether it enhances victim safety.89 One strand of the debate 
concerns victim autonomy of decision making.90 “No-drop” policies 
do not merely limit a prosecutor’s discretion to dismiss a case, they 
also limit a victim’s discretion to withdraw a complaint once formal 
charges have been filed.91  
Both proponents and opponents of no-drop acknowledge that 
no-drop deprives DV victims of decision-making autonomy.92 
Proponents argue that the deprivation is worthwhile because it 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Glanville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 123 (1989); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 86. See Kohn, supra note 26, at 240–41. 
 87. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 184–88 (providing an overview of the debate). 
For a more recent description of the debate, see MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 20–24. 
 88. As Madden Dempsey persuasively argues, many involved in this debate are talking 
past one another, because the effectiveness of prosecution policies has not yet been clearly 
defined in the literature and thus depends largely upon how one defines effectiveness. 
MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 167 & n.37.  
 89. See generally Hanna, supra note 34; Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the 
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 878–80 (1994). 
 90. Goodmark, supra note 52, at 31 (“Perhaps no issue has been so hotly debated 
among battered women’s legal advocates and scholars as whether and to what extent it is 
appropriate for the state to substitute its judgment for that of a battered woman when making 
decisions about arresting and prosecuting batterers.”). See generally Miccio, supra note 19 
(describing how battered women’s activists have always been aware of, and debated, the 
potential sacrifice to the victim’s autonomy of decision making when assessing whether to 
engage with the state to effect broad social change).  
 91. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 184; Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate 
Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999) (describing 
mandatory interventions as eliminating the state actor’s discretion, as well as the victim’s 
desires, from the state’s decision-making equation). 
 92. Goodmark, supra note 52, at 32 (“Both sides agree that, to a greater or lesser 
extent, these policies deprive battered women of agency: the ability to make crucial, potentially 
life and death, decisions, by and for themselves.”). 
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promotes victim safety in the long run.93 By punishing batterers, the 
state holds them accountable and sends the message to batterers and 
to society that the state will not tolerate DV.94 Proponents also 
maintain that victims are not in the best position to make decisions 
about their safety in a moment of crisis.95 Not only is the state in a 
better position to do so, but it is the state’s proper role, not the 
victim’s.96  
Opponents argue that only the victim can determine what is in 
her interest.97 Because victims are accurate predictors of the 
likelihood of re-abuse, prosecutors should respect a victim’s decision 
that pursuing prosecution will put her in more danger rather than 
less.98 Opponents also argue that victims who feel that their decisions 
are respected feel empowered, and victims who feel empowered are 
safer than those who do not.99 
 
 93. See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and 
the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 290 
(1997) (describing how this benefit to victims as a group, particularly those who are coerced or 
intimidated, outweighs the harm to an individual woman’s potential deprivation of autonomy). 
 94. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1890–91 (arguing that the goals of prosecution include 
reducing recidivism and communicating strong educational and social messages: “One of the 
most important ways to curb domestic violence is to ensure that abusers understand that 
society will not tolerate their behavior. A public education approach to domestic violence, 
coupled with punishment that demonstrates that there are consequences for violent behavior, 
can be effective both symbolically and practically.”); Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case 
for Aggressiveness for Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 173 (1997); see also discussion 
infra Part IV.C. 
 95. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Because Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 92 (2006) (arguing against asking of a victim what we would not ask of ourselves: to 
determine the course of her relationship in a moment of personal trauma).  
 96. Casey G. Gwinn & Sgt. Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police 
Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297 (1993) (arguing that when the victim 
steps into the shoes of the prosecutor, the batterer is given more control because he can 
pressure and intimidate her; the solution is to take responsibility out of the hands of the victim 
and place it with the state, where it belongs; the victim is not trained or paid to be the 
prosecutor); Hanna, supra note 34, at 1891–92; Wills, supra note 94, at 173 (arguing that the 
prosecutor rather than the victim should decide whether to go forward with charges and that 
this delineation of roles takes the responsibility off of the victim’s shoulders).  
 97. See, e.g., Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 166 (2003); Mills, supra note 91, 
at 554–55. 
 98. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A 
Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 818, 826–27 (2001); Mills, supra note 91, at 
599–600; Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of 
the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1159–60 (1994). 
 99. Welch, supra note 98, at 1159–60; see also David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The 
Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
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The autonomy that both sides speak of is the victim’s autonomy 
to make decisions about her safety. Less widely discussed in the “no-
drop debate” is the autonomy to make decisions about one’s 
personal relationships. Katherine Baker argues that feminist legal 
scholars have underappreciated the importance of relationships to 
victims.100 Of those scholars seeking to reform prosecutorial policy, 
only two treat the victim’s relational values as a central part of their 
suggestions for alternatives to no-drop.101 Linda Mills, in her earlier 
work, suggested that prosecutors adopt a “survivor-centered” 
approach to victims.102 Accordingly, the prosecutor should accept the 
emotional connection between a woman and her partner103 and 
explore with her how this connection, as well as religion, culture, 
race and other factors, affect her willingness to support 
 
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 157 (finding that victims who made a 
personal choice to cooperate with prosecutors’ requests were less likely to experience 
subsequent violence than women who were coerced to cooperate).  
 100. Baker, supra note 81, at 1471. 
 101. However, victims’ relational values are enormously important to scholars who 
embrace alternative theories of justice, such as restorative justice, therapeutic justice, and 
transformative justice. Alternative theories such as these are outside of the scope of this Article. 
For discussion of restorative justice in the context of DV, see generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (James Ptacek ed., 2009); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND 
FAMILY VIOLENCE (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002); Coker, supra note 12, at 
1 (analyzing Navajo peacemaking, an informal adjudicatory process recognized as a form of 
restorative justice, for battered women in the Navajo nation and for use in other locales and 
addressing major criticisms leveled against restorative justice models more generally); Loretta 
Frederick & Kristine C. Lizdas, The Role of Restorative Justice in the Battered Women’s 
Movement (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/app/abstractdb/ 
AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=239179. For a discussion of therapeutic justice in the context of 
DV, see generally Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33 (2000); Carolyn Copps Hartley, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Approach to the Trial Process in Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
410 (2003). For a discussion of transformative justice in the context of DV, see Donna Coker, 
Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence, in STRANG 
& BRAITHWAITE 129–52 (2003).  
 102. Mills, supra note 91, at 597–607. In her later work, Mills abandons the criminal 
justice system entirely as a viable option for addressing domestic violence. See, e.g., Linda G. 
Mills, Intimate Violence as Intimate: The Journey and a Path, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 461, 
462 (2003) (“The criminal justice system turned out to be an inadequate system for the 
problems posed by intimate abuse. . . . Intimate abuse is at heart, intimate . . . as much as we 
want to call it a ‘crime.’”); id. at 463 (“Once we accept that intimate abuse is intimate and 
therefore warrants a different way of thinking about violence, we can conceptualize the 
responses we suggest in more radical ways. . . . This will not be achieved by reforming the 
criminal justice system.”); see also Linda Mills et al., Circulos de Paz and the Promise of Peace: 
Restorative Justice Meets Intimate Violence, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127 (2009). 
 103. Mills, supra note 91, at 597. 
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prosecution.104 Mills argued that ultimately it should be the victim’s, 
rather than the prosecutor’s, decision to pursue or dismiss a case.105 I 
agree with Mills’s central theory—that a prosecutor’s decision must 
be informed by a victim’s relational context106—but a reflexive, 
“always drop” policy, without an investigation into the likelihood of 
coercion by the batterer, runs the risk of batterers intimidating 
victims into dropping.107  
Deborah Epstein suggested a model called “prosecution in 
context.”108 She asks prosecutors to view victims through an 
ecological lens. This lens reveals layers of factors, viewed as 
concentric circles surrounding the victim, that influence a victim’s 
strategic decision making for coping with violence.109 Epstein’s 
concentric circles include relations between the victim and her 
partner and the victim and her community.110 They also include 
individual, institutional, and economic factors.111 With a better 
understanding of the victim’s broad scope of concerns, Epstein 
argues, prosecutors are in a better position to facilitate victims’ long-
term safety,112 such as by dismissing charges when the likelihood of 
 
 104. Id. at 597–98. 
 105. Id. at 607–08. 
 106. I note the similarity between the value Mills places on the prosecutor’s consideration 
of the victim’s relational context and the value that relational contract theorists place on legal 
decision makers—particularly judges—to consider the litigants rather than their own 
understandings of the relational context. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the 
Promise of Relational Contract Theory—“Real” Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 
NW. U.L. REV. 909, 935 (2000) (“One could certainly attempt to argue that . . . judges 
should simply restrict themselves to their own contextual understandings in interpreting 
contracts rather than delving into the details of contractual context. But it is difficult to see 
how this would do anything but empower judges further, leaving them with no pressure to 
look outside of their own understandings in interpreting the words of others.”). 
 107. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36 at 19, 26–27 (arguing that “prosecutors who 
routinely abdicate their decision-making responsibility by universally deferring to victim’s 
requests . . . do a disservice not only to the individual victims, but they violate their obligation 
to execute the duties of their office in good faith” and that prosecutors must, at a minimum, 
ameliorate the concern that the victim is not, by her request to dismiss, merely attempting to 
appease her partner); Epstein, supra note 37, at 15–16 (describing “automatic drop” decisions 
by prosecutors as ceding too much control to a batterer, who need only threaten or intimidate 
the victim to persuade her to drop).  
 108. Deborah Epstein, Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming Aggressive 
Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic 
Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465 (2003). 
 109. Id. at 472. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 473. 
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felony level re-assault is high but probability of incarceration is 
low.113  
Epstein’s prosecution-in-context model is primarily concerned 
with victims’ safety, not victims’ relationships. In her more recent 
work, however, Epstein places far greater emphasis on victims’ 
relationships.114 She argues that system reform must evolve along 
two separate but related tracks: eradicating obstacles that prevent 
women who wish to leave from so doing, and promoting greater 
safety for women who choose to maintain their relationships with 
their partners.115  
Safety concerns and relational concerns often overlap in the 
context of victim decision making, but as Epstein’s dual tracks 
recognize, they are not co-extensive. A victim may choose to stay in 
a relationship that she knows is dangerous because the intimate 
connection is worth the risk. The debate surrounding victim 
decision-making autonomy in the context of prosecutorial reform, 
with the exception of Epstein’s work, largely ignores victims’ 
relational values. In a seminal article commenting on this body of 
scholarship, Cheryl Hanna observed, “the difficulty of encouraging a 
more public response to domestic violence while preserving women’s 
autonomy from excessive state intervention is a dilemma that no 
particular school of feminist thought has been able to resolve . . . 
.”116 Unstated, but significant to Hanna’s conclusion, is that the 
current “public response” to DV effectively ends the intimate 
relationship.117  
Many victims do leave their partners,118 and many cooperate with 
the justice system in so doing.119 For victims who want to separate 
from their partners, the criminal justice system’s response may be 
 
 113. Id. at 493. 
 114. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 72 (arguing that those involved in the 
domestic violence movement must understand the importance of a victim’s relationships and 
community ties). 
 115. Id. at 99. 
 116. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1855. 
 117. See discussion supra Part II.B. and accompanying notes; see also Gruber, supra note 
71, at 751 (arguing that Hanna is “pro-retribution-from-batterer” rather than pro-autonomy 
for victims, though she engages the autonomy rhetoric); Miccio, supra note 19, at 242, 293–
97 (arguing that Hanna’s characterization, which has been accorded considerable currency in 
the literature, fails to situate these policies in their proper historical context and thus has 
conservatized the debate).  
 118. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 61–68.  
 119. See KLEIN, supra note 47, at 45–46. 
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welcomed. But many want or need to preserve their relationships 
with their partners.120 To the extent that a legal response to DV 
requires termination of the relationship, Hanna’s argument is 
correct: no school of feminist thought has resolved the autonomy 
dilemma.121 Must a legal response ignore the relational values of the 
victim?122 The next section explores the applicability of an alternative 
legal framework—one that emphasizes, rather than ignores—the 
relational norms and values that envelop the “discrete” issue they 
present to the legal system. 
III. WHY RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY? 
RCT proposes an alternative way for the legal system to analyze 
contracts.123 It rejects the idea that the practice of contracting can be 
understood by viewing contracts as discrete, one-shot deals between 
strangers, during which a meeting of the minds is thought to have 
 
 120. See discussion supra Part II.C. and accompanying notes.  
 121. Goodmark, supra note 52, at 32 (observing that the question of whether the state 
should step in has no easy answer). 
 122. See Littleton, supra note 11, at 52.  Christine Littleton asks: “What would legal 
doctrine and practice look like if it took seriously a mandate to make women safer in 
relationships, instead of offering separation as the only remedy for violence against women?” 
Id. 
 123. Actually, RCT may suggest several alternative ways for the legal system to analyze 
contracts, depending upon how one views its underlying empirical claim that contracts are 
deeply relational. See Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendship (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358562, 6–12 (discussing how, if one views contracts as 
pervasively relational, one might call for a complete paradigm shift in contract theory, whereas 
if one views only some contracts as deeply relational, one might call for a more moderate shift 
such as a different set of rules to be applied to this specific set of contracts. Or one could use a 
continuum to distinguish types of contracts—such as Macneil’s as-if-discrete to relational 
continuum—that would be analytically useful). The notion that a subset of contracts are 
relational and call for a specific set of rules has been described as the neoclassical or mainstream 
contract law’s interpretation of RCT. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in 
Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 740 (2000). For Feinman, this interpretation does not go far 
enough. Id. For the purpose of this Article, I focus on the positions advanced by Ian Macneil, 
founder of RCT, and Stewart Macaulay and Jay Feinman, self-proclaimed followers of Macneil, 
all of whom Leib would, I believe, include in a category he calls “hard core relationists.” Leib, 
supra, at 7. While I rely upon Macneil and his followers, I note that there are several strands of 
RCT. Id. at n.2; see also Fox, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“[T]here are almost as many definitions of 
relational contract theory as there are scholars discussing it.”); id. at 4–5 (citing examples such 
as law-and-economics based relational contract theory, Ian Macneil’s foundational relational 
contract theory, law-and-society relational contract theory, libertarian relational contract 
theory, and liberal communitarian relational contract theory (citations omitted)).  
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occurred.124 This “transaction” almost never provides an accurate 
picture of the parties’ understanding of their obligations to each 
other. What really matters are the rules, or “norms,” that emerge 
from the relationship itself, such as loyalty, or the desire to preserve 
the relationship.125 Rather than treating contracting parties as if they 
are strangers—the paradigm of classical contract law—contract law 
and theory should focus on the parties’ relationships and “relational 
norms” flowing from them.126  
In this section, after sketching out fundamental principles of 
RCT, I turn in Part B to the question: what do these principles have 
to do with how the criminal justice system should respond to DV? In 
the same way that RCT has provided an important perspective from 
which to criticize substantive contract law, the relational values 
perspective is a valuable lens through which to critique the current 
regime governing DV law. Like relational contract theorists, feminist 
legal theorists criticize the law’s “transactionization” of relationships. 
They argue that the law’s myopic view of DV as discrete episodes of 
physical violence, in isolation from the underlying intimate 
relationship, distorts legal actors’ understanding of the victim’s 
responses to the violence and obstructs the law’s capacity to fully 
redress DV. In short, like relational contract theorists, many feminist 
legal theorists oppose the law’s treatment of parties involved in 
relationships as if they are strangers. 
In Part C, I argue that the relationship enveloping an incident of 
DV is an “exchange relation,” to further explain the analogy to and 
relevance of RCT in the context of DV. I identify and address a 
critique of the analogy—that RCT applies to parties who have 
relatively equal power. I interpret RCT to be particularly concerned 
 
 124. Leib, supra note 123, at 3 (describing the most general point of relationists: 
“discrete, one-shot transactions between strangers have occupied the center of ‘classical’ 
contract law and contract theory to its detriment”); see also Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract 
Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 767 (1998). 
 125. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 126. Feinman, supra note 123, at 748 (describing the fundamental unit of inquiry of 
relational contract theory as the extensiveness of the parties’ relation rather than the discrete 
transaction); see also Leib, supra note 123, at 2 (describing relational contract theorists as those 
“who urge us to focus on ‘relational’ elements in contracts in order to devise a theory and law 
of contracts”). 
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with exchanges that involve unequal power,127 and argue that this 
makes RCT particularly pertinent in the context of DV. 
A. What Is Relational Contract Theory? 
First articulated in the 1960s, RCT was borne out of opposition 
to traditional contract law. A “persistent tendency of [current 
contract] law is its attempt to locate the entire content of the parties’ 
agreement, and thus the entire source of their obligation to each 
other, in an initial moment of agreement that contracts treatises 
describe as the ‘meeting of the minds.’”128 Ian Macneil sought to 
construct a coherent and relevant rival law,129 one that emphasized 
the social and interpersonal relations between the parties and not 
simply the contractual agreement.130 Indeed, for Macneil, “contract” 
and “relation” are synonymous: “contract” is a relationship in which 
parties are, were, or will be exchanging something131 and “a” 
contract is “a particular example of such relations.”132 
Macneil defined exchange expansively.133 It involves any human 
interaction in which reciprocity, or the giving up of something in 
return for something else, is a dominant element.134 Reciprocity does 
 
 127. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 
1307–08 (1990) (describing relational contract theorists’ interest in context, and particular 
different contexts of power, lead to their argument that these require different legal treatment). 
 128. Gudel, supra note 124, at 767–68 (describing how criticism of existing contract law 
has centered on the persistent tendency of classical contract law to “attempt to locate the entire 
content of the parties’ agreement, and thus the entire source of their obligation to one 
another, in an initial moment of agreement that contracts treatises describe as the ‘meeting of 
the minds.’ Correspondingly, courts have been extremely reluctant to intervene in any contract 
if that intervention cannot be justified by reference, albeit fictional, to this magic moment of 
agreement”). 
 129. MACNEIL, supra note 10, at 9. 
 130. Fox, supra note 7, at 5 (describing all strands of RCT as sharing one important 
characteristic: “they emphasize the social and interpersonal relations between the parties to the 
contract and not simply the contractual agreement of those parties.”). 
 131. Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
877, 878 (2000) (“In this Article, ‘contract’ means relations among people who have 
exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the future—in other words, 
exchange relations. Experience has shown that the very idea of contract as relations in which 
exchange occurs—rather than as specific transactions, specific agreements, specific promises, 
specific exchanges, and the like—is extremely difficult for many people to grasp.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 132. Id. at 878 n.6. 
 133. Feinman, supra note 123, at 741. 
 134. MACNEIL, supra note 10, at 47. 
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not call for equality,135 but only that the participants to the exchange 
subjectively perceive a benefit.136  
This expansive definition of exchange is important in the analogy 
between RCT and DV law, in two key ways. First, RCT applies to a 
wide array of relations beyond those existing in business or 
commercial settings.137 Macneil explicitly included the marital 
relationship, and relations within the nuclear family, as examples of 
relational exchanges.138 Scholars have since applied RCT to a 
continuum of intimate relationships, from marriage139 to non-marital 
intimate relationships140 to friendship.141 
 
 135. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 44 (1980). 
 136. Id. (explaining that reciprocity calls merely for each participant’s perception of a 
possible improvement from pre-exchange conditions). 
 137. Feinman, supra note 123, at 741 (“[T]he scope of relational contract is very general, 
in some respects even more general than was classical contract law. It brings back within the 
field of contract law some of the topics that were spun off in the development of neoclassical 
law; labor relations is a prominent example. It breaks down doctrinal boundaries further by 
potentially bringing tort and property law topics within the definition of contract. And it 
brings within the scope of contract relations those activities that have economic aspects but 
that are not primarily economic, such as family relations. Relational contract, therefore, is 
willing to treat an astonishingly wide range of transactions as subject to the same body of 
theory.” (citations omitted)). 
 138. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 721, 725, 
746, 747, 751 (1974) (describing marriage as a relational contract); Id. at 785–86 (describing 
parent-child and sibling-sibling relationships as relational contracts). 
 139. For applications of RCT to marriage, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social 
Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1919–25 (2000) 
(discussing generally the relational norms in marriage as a complex set of expectations and 
patterns of behavior that evolve over time); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of 
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 302 (1982) (“[M]arriage is 
exceptionally well captured by [Macneil’s] relational type. The overriding importance of 
continuing relationships; the whole-person nature of the exchange; the presence of quantifiable 
and nonquantifiable elements; the expected range of interaction, from altruism to self-interest 
to conflict; the need for planning as a continuing process that focuses on flexibility of structure 
and procedure rather than on any single transaction; the emphasis on remedies that repair and 
restructure relationships rather than replace a specific failed performance—each of these 
characteristics of Macneil’s relational contract type is an important characteristic of marriage.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Laura Weinrib, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at 
Relational Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 207, 211 (2002) (describing how the 
principles established in relational dissolution carry over into every aspect of family formation 
and inter-relation,and specifically examining the doctrine of constructive trust).  
 140. See John Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the 
Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 93 (2000). 
 141. See Leib, supra note 123 (arguing that friendship—rather than marriage—should be 
viewed as the paradigmatic relational contract); Id. at 2 & n.4 (describing and citing relational 
contract theorists who argue that the bulk of contracts are like marriages).  
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Second, a common view of DV victims is that they are passive, 
helpless—even paralyzed—in their intimate relationships, and as a 
result, stay with their partners.142 This view fails to account for all 
that victims get from their relationships, and all that they risk by 
leaving.143 In relational contract terms, this view ignores the 
existence of reciprocity. In feminist legal parlance, it denies a victim’s 
agency (or autonomy)—a topic of concern to any scholar exploring 
how the state should respond to DV.144  
To understand an exchange, legal actors must carefully examine 
the relational context within which the exchange occurred. Macneil 
gives this example: 
Consider ‘I promise you $400 a week.’ It means one thing when a 
personnel manager says it to a newly hired employee receiving a 
weekly wage, something else when a foreman says it to an hourly 
employee who has been complaining about short working hours, 
something else when said by a sales manager to a commission 
salesman, again something different when said by a salesman of 
video games to the owner of a video game arcade. And yet a 
promise of so many dollars is one of the clearest, least-affected-by-
context promises to be found. Most promises, even those 
concerning the sale of goods, are far less understandable freed of 
their relational context.145 
Ignoring the relational context produces a body of law that is 
empirically irrelevant.146 Stewart Macaulay, Macneil’s 
contemporary,147 demonstrated as an empirical matter that contract 
law bore little resemblance to what people in the business world 
engaging in contract actually do.148 Macaulay describes “[falling] 
down the rabbit hole to the land of empiricism,” when as a young 
contracts professor, he spoke with his father-in-law, a retired CEO, 
 
 142. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 143. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 144. See discussion infra Part V.B.4 (discussing victim agency/autonomy). 
 145. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 483, 502 (1985). 
 146. MACNEIL, supra note 10. 
 147. Stewart Macaulay’s ground-breaking empirical work is described as the counterpart 
to Macneil’s ground-breaking theoretical work. See Fox, supra note 7, at 6–7 (describing how, 
in the 1960s, scholars began exploring what was actually “going on in the world of 
contracting” and were finding the answer was based on the empirical work of Stewart 
Macaulay and the theoretical work of Macneil); infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 148. Fox, supra note 7, at 7.  
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who described “a business world where long-term continuing 
relationships provided their own norms and sanctions. Contract law 
was either unnecessary or something far at the margins of the way 
things worked.”149  
This was the conclusion Macaulay drew in 1963 in his renowned 
study of the role of contract law in the everyday functioning of the 
business world.150 The driving force in continued contractual 
relations is not the fear of legal consequences, but relational and 
reputational sanctions.151 Since even discrete transactions take place 
in a setting of continuing relationships and interdependence, the 
“value of these relationships means that all involved must work to 
satisfy each other. Potential disputes are suppressed, ignored, or 
compromised in the service of keeping the relationship alive.”152 
Several scholars since Macaulay have empirically demonstrated 
the gap between contract doctrine and the day to day practice of 
contract.153 According to Macneil, the primary way that the law 
ignores the reality of contracting is by “transactionizing” 
relationships, in two ways.154 First, the law imagines an exchange as 
having a clear start and finish, severable from both the events 
temporally precedent and subsequent to the exchange.155 Second, it 
conceptualizes a transaction separate from the values (like the desire 
 
 149. Mark P. Gergen, Victor Goldberg, Stewart Macaulay & Keith A. Rowley, Transcript 
of Panel Discussion—Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg’s Framing Contract Law, 49 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 469, 476 (2007). 
 150. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).  
 151. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–69 
(1985). 
 152. Id. at 468. 
 153. See Feinman, supra note 127, at 1304–08 (describing Empirical Contract Theory 
and summarizing the findings of its school of thought); Leib, supra note 123, at 5 n.9 (citing 
Macaulay as well as the works of Bob Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, and David Charny).  
 154. Macneil refers to the Restatement’s definition as examples of this transactionization: 
“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or 
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” Macneil, supra note 138, 
at 693 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 1 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1–7, 1973)). 
 155. Macneil asked: “[I]s the world of contract a world of discrete transactions so 
defined? Or is it a world of relation, an ongoing dynamic state, no segment of which—past, 
present or future—can sensibly be viewed independently from other segments?” Id. at 694 
(citation omitted). 
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to smooth over difficulties in order to further the relationship)156 of 
the parties participating in it.157  
Real life, Macneil argued, is “a world of relation, an ongoing 
dynamic state,” not a world of discrete transactions.158 Relational 
contract law promises “freedom from the conceptual restraints of a 
discrete system.”159 
B. The Importance of Relational Context in DV Law 
The criminal law, as applied to DV, is “[p]remised on a 
transactional model of crime that isolates and decontextualizes 
violence.”160 DV scholars have leveled critiques of this transactional, 
decontextualized approach in two particular contexts: when arguing 
for greater retribution from men who are violent toward their female 
partners and when arguing for less retribution from women who are 
violent toward their male partners.161 
In calling for increased retribution against men charged with 
DV, feminist legal scholars argue in favor of consideration of 
relational norms. For example, several scholars have argued for the 
reform of statutory definitions of DV to capture the batterer’s 
pattern of coercive behaviors, not just the incident of physical 
violence.162 Scholars have proposed reforms to the evidence code 
 
 156. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of Macneil’s contract values and norms. 
 157. Macneil, supra note 138, at 694 (citation omitted). 
 158. Id. (citation omitted). 
 159. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 77. 
 160. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call 
to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 960–61 (2004).  
 161. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to 
Violent Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 972 (1998) (“To put it bluntly, feminists have 
pushed for greater retribution, including criminal prosecutions, for violence done to women, 
and more caring empathic responses to women who risk criminal charges for their own 
conduct. This pattern smacks not only of inconsistency, but also of unreflective desires simply 
to advance what is good for women.”); see also MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at n.59 (“It 
is ironic that those who call for formalistic, reigned law enforcement policies for arrest also 
complain when victims who engage in retaliatory violence are arrested and prosecuted.”); cf. 
Martha McMahon & Ellen Pence, Making Social Change, Reflections on Individual and 
Institutional Advocacy With Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 47, 71 (2003) (arguing that advocacy for women who are arrested for DV “will be 
countered by accusations of reverse sexism” and that such arguments are answered by 
“explaining the gendered nature of violence and the meaning of pursuing equality in social 
contexts in which people are clearly not equal in power or social resources”).  
 162. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An 
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 601–03 (2007) (proposing a 
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that would admit otherwise prohibited prior bad acts for the purpose 
of proving the course of conduct that is “battering.”163 They have 
argued that if the course of conduct and not just the violent episode 
were recognized, more serious charges could be filed and tougher 
sentences could be imposed.164  
Based on the same reasoning, scholars argue that contemporary 
doctrine governing a batterer’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 
his witness should be re-examined.165 As argued in two ground-
 
“Coercive Domestic Violence” statute that includes an inchoate theory of liability); Joan 
Erskine, Note, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Recharacterizing Domestic Violence As Criminal 
Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207 (1999) (arguing that domestic violence be defined as a 
crime of coercion); Victor Tadros, The Distinctiveness of Domestic Violence: A Freedom Based 
Account, 65 LA. L. REV. 989, 993 (2005) (arguing for a “crime of domestic violence” because 
“[t]o regulate domestic abuse is to regulate relationships” in which violence occurs 
systematically, distinguishing it from stranger violence); Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at 
1019–20 (proposing that battering be defined as a course of conduct crime in which the 
batterer reasonably should know that the conduct is likely to result in substantial power or 
control over the victim or her family). 
 163. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Fostering Domestic Violence Prosecutions After 
Crawford/Davis: Proposal For Legislative Action, 44 CRIM. LAW BULL. 871 (2008) 
(advocating for two new federal and state evidence rules that would incorporate the definition 
of domestic violence and create an exception for admissibility of evidence of prior domestic 
violence in domestic violence cases); Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers 
Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 907 (2009) (proposing an 
amendment to FRE 804(b)(6) that would “delete the present requirement that the opponent 
of the hearsay must have ‘engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did 
procure, the unavailability of the declarant as a witness,’” and replace it with “language 
requiring that the opponent of the hearsay must have ‘engaged in wrongdoing that foreseeably 
could cause, and did in fact proximately cause, the unavailability of the declarant as a witness’” 
(citation omitted)). See generally Sarah J. Lee, The Search for Truth: Admitting Evidence of 
Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221 (1998); Lisa A. Linsky, Use 
of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the Criminal Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 
16 PACE L. REV. 73 (1995); Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes: 
Effectively Using Rule 404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. 
REV. 361 (1998–99). 
 164. See, e.g., Erksine, supra note 162, at 1221 (arguing that if viewed as coercion, in 
many cases prosecutors could bring felony rather than misdemeanor charges); Evan Stark, Re-
Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 973, 980–81 (1995) (“My concern is that this [episodic] categorization of domestic 
violence has created a new (second) class of misdemeanor assaults rather than criminalized the 
far more severe pattern of coercive behaviors that are distinctive to partner relationships, that 
is, battering.”). In the context of advocating for more lenient sentences for women arrested for 
domestic violence, see McMahon & Pence, supra note 161, at 70 (arguing for a sentencing 
matrix that “attempts to contextualize violence” and thus “is a shift from determining a 
sentence based on the defendant’s relationship to the state to one based on understanding his 
or her relationship to the victim”). 
 165. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 
750 (2005) (arguing that after Crawford v. Washington, “[s]tatutory hearsay law is now 
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breaking articles by Deborah Tuerkheimer, “a ‘relational approach’ 
to Confrontation Clause analysis” is in order.166 If DV was 
conceptualized as ongoing, rather than episodic, a victim’s out of 
court statements to police would be deemed exigent and therefore 
admissible at trial without being subject to cross examination by the 
defendant.167 Indeed, a DV victim’s statements occurring between 
episodes of DV should be considered exigent because of the 
relational norms inherent in DV.168 
In contexts in which women are held criminally liable for 
assaulting their partners, feminist legal scholars argue that the 
transactional approach is unmistakably problematic. One of the most 
widely discussed topics in this body of scholarship is how the law 
should treat battered women who kill their abusive partners.169 
Scholars argue that evidence of the social context must be admitted 
for judges and jurors to accurately apply the doctrine of self-
 
misaligned with constitutional confrontation law, and the incongruities are more problematic 
in domestic violence prosecutions than in any other context”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A 
Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 727 
(2007) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Relational Approach]; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s 
Triangle, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle]; see also 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
 166. Tuerkheimer, Relational Approach, supra note 165, at 727; see also Tuerkheimer, 
Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 165, at 7 (“A full appreciation of the dynamics of abuse and 
attention to the context of relationship that embeds victim and defendant results in what I call 
a ‘relational approach’ to Confrontation Clause analysis.”). 
 167. Tuerkheimer, Relational Approach, supra note 165, at 730 (explaining the 
conceptual tension underlying the bar on testimonial hearsay as an “uncritical acceptance of . . 
. ‘the dichotomy between a plea of help and testimonial statements’’’). For a domestic violence 
victim, this dichotomy is false because her narration of events to police—what would in 
paradigmatic stranger violence cases be considered testimonial statements—are part and parcel 
of her ability to obtain immediate protection. A “narration of past events” is necessary “to 
resolve the immediate danger they precipitated. This reality fatally undermines judicial 
reasoning predicated on the ‘crying for help’ versus ‘providing information to law 
enforcement’ rubric.” Id. at 732. 
 168. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 165, at 24–25 (“The domestic 
violence victim’s exigency extends beyond what might appear to an outside observer, or even 
to the ‘reasonable person’ unfamiliar with the culture of the particular battering relationship, 
to be the ‘end’ of the criminal incident. . . . In short, the meaning of ‘exigency’ to a victim of 
domestic violence is different than it is to victims of other types of crime.”). 
 169. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 112–47 (summarizing legal reform for battered 
women who kill and the misunderstood framework of equality in judicial application of the law 
to these cases); Mahoney, supra note 66, at 35 n.141. See generally BROWNE, supra note 72 
(providing a historical overview of women who kill their abusive partners and describing the 
legal response). 
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defense.170 Self-defense may not be asserted unless the defendant’s 
actions are perceived as reasonable, and the determination of 
reasonableness involves both subjective (the defendant’s perspective) 
and objective (the reasonableness of that perspective) components.171 
Evidence of “battering”—a pattern of intimidation, coercion, and 
violence—provides the only “appropriate context in which to decide 
whether a woman’s apprehension of imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm was reasonable.”172  
Scholars extend this argument to the arrest of a woman for the 
use of any violence against her partner. “To understand women’s use 
of violence means one must understand the context.”173 A woman 
may use force not only in self-defense, but also in response to a 
recent assault by her partner or in response to her partner’s ongoing 
abuse.174 Such violence may be a signal that she will not simply 
“take” the abuse, or a symbolic assertion of dignity.175 The pertinent 
inquiry is whether she used force to achieve the relational norms of 
power and control.176 
Because an isolated incident of violence is not the equivalent of 
“battering,” victims’ advocates argue that in the context of deciding 
whether and how to prosecute women, prosecutors must carefully 
investigate relational norms. For example, prosecutors should 
consider whether the defendant is a victim of ongoing abuse.177 They 
should consider gender norms, and the gendered nature of domestic 
violence.178 They should identify the relational norms that dominate 
 
 170. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and 
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991). 
 171. See id. at 391. 
 172. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 124. 
 173. See McMahon & Pence, supra note 161, at 51. 
 174. Id. (“A woman may or may not hit back at the moment when she is being beaten or 
abused—many women will not, as they realistically fear that any display of defiance will result 
in an even more brutal beating. Rather than simply ‘taking it,’ however, some women will 
choose a safer and more strategic moment to ‘hit back’ . . . . Whereas one may understand that 
interpersonal violence has historically been a masculinist resource to help men maintain power 
and control over women, women’s use of violence in intimate relationships does not typically 
carry the same gendered cultural meaning of powerfulness, nor does it likely accomplish the 
outcome of control.”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 68. 
 178. Id. at 65, 68 (citing Shamita Das Dasgupta, A Framework for Understanding 
Women’s Use of Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 1364, 1377–80 (2002)); see also Joan Zorza, The Problem with Proxy 
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relationships of immigrant victims and partners.179 In light of these 
relational norms, advocates argue that if female defendants are not 
“batterers,” prosecutors should not pursue a conviction merely 
because it is technically possible.180 
These scholars’ critiques of the transactional approach to DV 
illustrate a shared normative value: consideration of the dynamics 
and norms of the underlying relationship should be critical to the 
law’s treatment of DV. This is precisely what Macneil has in mind.181 
I extend this reasoning to a prosecutor’s decision to proceed with or 
dismiss charges when the victim is female and the defendant is male. 
Before doing so, however, I pause to address what may seem on the 
surface to be a problem with the analogy between RCT and DV law.  
C. The Incomplete Analogy 
RCT applies to “exchanges.” One may ask: where is the 
exchange, when one party physically assaults another? The incident 
of violence is not an exchange; rather, it is the relationship 
enveloping that incident. 
As noted earlier, Macneil defined exchange as involving any 
interaction in which reciprocity is a dominant element,182 and noted 
explicitly that reciprocity does not require equality.183 But when one 
party maintains power and control in a relationship, can there be 
reciprocity? According to Macneil, a wide range of relationships 
 
Measures: The Inaccuracy of the Conflict Tactic Scales and Other Crime Surveys in Measuring 
Intimate Partner Violence, 6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 83 (2001), reprinted in 2 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 8–12 to 8–18 (Joan Zorza ed., 2004). 
 179. See Zelda B. Harris, The Predicament of the Immigrant Victim/Defendant: “VAWA 
Diversion” and Other Considerations in Support of Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (2004). 
 180. McMahon & Pence, supra note 161, at 67. 
 181. As Macneil stated: “Relations involve a flow of exchanges, or often many flows at 
the same time, occurring in complex patterns not lending themselves to divisions into discrete 
periods. It follows that relational contract law must, if it is to concern itself at all with 
mutuality and power, deal with those issues before, during, and after exchanges.” MACNEIL, 
supra note 135, at 86. This does not mean that discrete legal principles are never appropriate, 
but rather that “these principles can never be the absolutes they intend to be in a system of 
discrete transactional law.” Id.  
 182. Feinman, supra note 123, at 741 (quoting Macneil, supra note 131, at 546–48). 
 183. MACNEIL, supra note 10, at 47; see also Feinman, supra note 127, at 1301 & n.81 
(arguing that, contrary to modern contract law, RCT recognizes that relations are not mutually 
favorable to all, because “they arise out of social conditions of inequality” and thus “include 
elements of coercion and dependence”; modern law, on the other hand, assumes “rough 
equality”). 
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constitute exchange relations.184 Among these are abusive exchange 
relations. 
[I insist upon including in the concept] one-sided and abusive 
exchange relations . . . . [T]he presence of such characteristics in 
relations does not somehow magically wipe out the element of 
exchange . . . . [T]he failure to include highly coercive, one-sided, 
and abusive relations creates the need for an entirely arbitrary 
dividing line between what is sufficiently coercive to exclude the 
relation from the realm of exchange relations and what is not.185 
Perhaps DV—a pattern of behaviors “defined by both physical 
and non-physical manifestations of power”186—is not an entirely 
arbitrary dividing line. One could argue that battered women are so 
coercively controlled that their choices are actually “choiceless.”187 I 
join those who argue that this is not the case for most victims of 
DV,188 but that law assumes it to be so.189 This assumption is the 
product of early theories of DV put forth by advocates and social 
theorists to explain DV to legal decision-makers.190  
 
 184. See MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 1–5. 
 185. MACNEIL, supra note 10, at 47 (citing Ian R. Macneil, Political Exchange as 
Relational Contract, in GENERALIZED POLITICAL EXCHANGE: ANTAGONISTIC COOPERATION 
AND INTEGRATED POLICY CIRCUITS 151, 155 (Bernd Marin ed., 1990)).  
 186. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at 962–63 (“Outside the criminal law context, 
domestic violence is widely understood as an ongoing pattern of behavior defined by both 
physical and non-physical manifestations of power.”). 
 187. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking 
the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 641–42 (2000) (arguing for guardianship in 
certain DV cases in which victims are so extremely coerced that they cannot make voluntary 
decisions). 
 188. See Stark, supra note 164; see also, e.g., MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 19–20 
(explaining that, in the context of victims who decide not to support the prosecution of their 
partners, the majority are not requesting a dismissal merely to appease the batterer); Miccio, 
supra note 19, at 320–21 (arguing that the view that autonomy is meaningless because it is 
exercised in the face of oppression and terror obscures victims’ resistance to that oppression 
and terror, and “denies how women survivors of male intimate violence have become agents in 
their own lives”). 
 189. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-
Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832–35 (1999) (arguing that the law overlooks 
victims’ “resistant self-direction” or acts of agency). For a discussion of how the “disabling 
dichotomy between notions of women’s victimization and agency manifests itself in diverse 
areas of feminist legal theory” and in laws addressing domestic violence, see SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 17, at 74–86. 
 190. Kohn, supra note 26, at 198 (describing the “coercion theories,” such as learned 
helplessness, put forth by victim advocates to explain DV to judges and prosecutors). 
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Over the last three decades, two theories of DV have developed 
to explain DV victims’ reactions to violence.191 The first, referred to 
as the “traumatization framework,”192 has its roots in the pioneering 
work of Lenore Walker.193 Walker posited that victims were 
paralyzed by an exaggerated sense of the batterer’s control over their 
lives.194 As a result, victims believed that none of their actions could 
either change the batterer’s behavior or could help them escape the 
violent relationship.195 This theory, “learned helplessness,” was used 
by lawyers representing women—largely in self-defense cases—to 
explain the dynamics of DV to judges and juries.196  
Although Walker later repudiated the concept of learned 
helplessness, explaining that it was a mythology to characterize a 
victim’s behavior as exclusively passive,197 pieces of the theory loom 
large in the legal response to DV.198 As Christine Littleton put it, the 
“syndrome” of Battered Woman Syndrome lingers, while its cause—
violence by men—disappears.199 However, like post-traumatic stress 
disorder and other traumatization theories, learned helplessness 
applies to only a minority of DV victims.200 Large scale research 
conducted since Walker’s work has shown that battered women 
 
 191. Lisa Goodman et al., The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index, 9 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 163, 165–66 (2003) (describing the frameworks—learned helplessness and 
survivor theory—and creating a research instrument to measure the nature and extent of 
battered women’s strategic responses to violence in the context of a longitudinal study of 
battered women’s experience over time). 
 192. Stark, supra note 164, at 1000 (referring to Battered Woman Syndrome and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, in the context of their use to explain victims’ behaviors in court). 
 193. LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). 
 194. LENORE E. A. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND 
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 73 (1989). 
 195. Goodman et al., supra note 191, at 165. 
 196. See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1303–06 
(1993); see also Dutton, supra note 73, at 1215–26 (1993).  
 197. WALKER, supra note 193, at 33. 
 198. Kohn, supra note 26, at 198 (noting that legal actors have internalized theories such 
as learned helplessness); Littleton, supra note 11, at 42 (“In Walker’s account of learned 
helplessness, the cause (random, uncontrollable violence inflicted by men) is at least part of the 
‘syndrome.’ In the case law, the cause disappears while the ‘syndrome’ remains.”). 
 199. Littleton, supra note 11, at 42. 
 200. Stark, supra note 164, at 1000 (describing Walker’s learned helplessness model of 
depression as part of the traumatization framework and noting that “[T]he traumatization 
framework applies to only a minority of battered women, emphasizes the disabling effects of 
violence rather than women’s survival skills, and fails to adequately distinguish post-traumatic 
events . . . from intratraumatic stress . . . .”). 
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actually become increasingly active, not increasingly passive, in their 
attempts to cope with violence in their relationships.201 A number of 
studies, both qualitative and quantitative, have provided support for 
this now widely accepted “survivor theory” of DV.202  
Drawing a line between battered women’s relationships (or 
exchanges) and “normal”203 relationships is exactly the kind of 
arbitrary line Macneil opposes in the realm of contract. To exclude 
relations involving DV from a definition of exchange relations would 
render nearly half of all intimate relationships as in need of an 
exception to the rule.204 Yet, she argues, the law treats DV as if it is a 
 
 201. Goodman et al., supra note 191, at 165–66 (citations omitted); see also LEE H. 
BOWKER, BEATING WIFE-BEATING 75–85 (1983). 
 202. See Goodman et al., supra note 191, at 166 (summarizing the empirical literature). 
 203. I use quotation marks to describe “normal” because of the prevalence of DV in 
intimate, heterosexual relationships. See Littleton, supra note 11, at 56–57 (arguing that if 
women are seen as abnormal, or crazy, for staying in abusive relationships, “then as many as 
half of all women’s relationships with men are crazy”). 
 204. And it would render suspect the substantial body of scholarship applying RCT to 
marriage. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing this body of scholarship). I 
note that at least one prominent scholar applying RCT to marriage, Elizabeth Scott, has been 
criticized for insufficiently considering domestic violence. See Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory 
Marriage “For the Sake of the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 
1435, 1443–46 (1992) (criticizing Scott’s argument in favor of a mandatory waiting period 
before divorce as “blind or at best insensitive to the realities of life for battered women”). 
Scott’s response to this criticism is conclusory: “A straightforward response to an abusive 
spouse is legal separation with spousal support, if appropriate, together with an injunctive 
restraining order.” Scott, supra note 139, at 1962 n.166. This response relies far too heavily 
on the effectiveness of protection orders, the enforcement of which is widely acknowledged 
among DV scholars as an Achilles Heel. See ANDREW R. KLEIN, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 75 (2004). While I agree with Lacey’s critique of Scott, 
and more generally that the work of scholars who apply RCT to marriage would be greatly 
enriched by deeper consideration of DV, I believe the body of scholarship applying RCT to 
marriage has much to offer feminist legal scholars who seek a reconceptualization of the 
market-based, arm’s-length, autonomous transactor engaged in a discrete transaction 
paradigm. Citation to these scholars is potentially voluminous, but for some examples, see 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. J. 997 (1985); Mary Joe Frug, Re-reading 
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); 
Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247 (1999); Patricia A. 
Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid—Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and 
Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791 (1991). Similarly, the work of scholars who apply RCT to 
marriage has much to offer feminist legal scholars who seek a reconceptualization within the 
criminal law of DV as a relation, rather than a discrete transaction. See discussion supra Part 
III.B.  
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mysterious aberration.205 The law must incorporate, rather than 
exclude, consideration of DV, given its widespread occurrence.  
To do so, the law must account for coercion, rather than exclude 
it. Excluding coerced choices obscures the reality that all choices 
involve some degree of coercion.206 The types of pressure exerted 
and their effects must be examined.207 No-drop prosecution policies 
do the opposite. Rather than investigating whether or how a victim 
is coerced, no-drop policies presume that the victim is coerced208 and 
that, as a result, any decision to drop is untrustworthy or invalid.209  
Macneil rejects such a presumption in law, favoring instead an 
investigation into, rather than exclusion of, coerced exchanges.210 
His view of the doctrine of undue influence in classical contract law 
illustrates this concept. He argues that undue influence is a factual 
circumstance that should be included within, rather than outside of, 
a definition of contract.211 The task is to carefully assess the types of 
 
 205. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 11 (“This radical discrepancy between the ‘mysterious’ 
character of domestic violence and repeatedly gathered statistics reflects massive denial 
throughout society and the legal system.”); see also MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 7 
(coining the term “domestic violence amnesia,” a syndrome in which infected academics briefly 
note the prevalence of domestic violence and then “promptly forget this fact when making 
empirical claims and reaching normative conclusions”). 
 206. See generally Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic 
Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER & JUST. 2 (2007); Miccio, 
supra note 19, at 317–21. 
 207. Kuennen, supra note 206, at 5–6 (arguing for a conceptualization of coercion in 
legal analyses of domestic violence that account for, among other factors, the type and severity 
of the batterer’s pressure on the victim to pursue or drop a case). 
 208. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1891–92 (arguing that when prosecutors dismiss domestic 
violence cases, this shows that the batterer’s use of “[f]ear, intimidation, and imposition of 
guilt on the victim ‘work’”); id. at 1891 (“If participation is mandated, the state takes away the 
batterer’s ability to influence the victim’s actions.”); Wills, supra note 94, at 179–80 (“A ‘no 
drop’ policy means prosecutors will not allow batterers to control the system of justice through 
their victims.”).  
 209. Kuennen, supra note 206, at 27 (arguing that a victim’s decision to drop a case, 
even if done in response to a batterer’s pressure, is not by definition an “involuntary” decision; 
rather, a victim’s decision to drop may be quite strategic and well-reasoned). 
 210. Macneil, supra note 145, at 504–05 (“We may or may not want to relieve the 
overstretched businessman or the unemployed worker who makes onerous arrangements. But 
our decision depends on the nature and amounts of pressure they are under as well as many 
other circumstances, not on any concept of ‘real voluntariness.’”). 
 211. Ian R. Macneil, Review of H. Shepherd and B. D. Sher, Law in Society: An 
Introduction to Freedom of Contract, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 176, 177 (1960) (describing the 
concept of undue influence as one example of an exception “to some general rule permitting 
the parties fully to define their legal status [but] if the role of the law in creating contracts were 
more completely presented this distortion would not occur, and these matters would be seen 
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pressure brought to bear and the manner in which this is done, not 
to exclude this pressure from the law’s consideration. Relational 
contract theorists acknowledge that in relationships—unlike in 
discrete transactions—power is shifting and dynamic.212 And in many 
relationships, the “dominated party continues in the relationship 
because it is the best of a bad set of options open.”213 
Macneil’s inclusion of coerced and even abusive relations within 
a legal approach to contract is one part of its appeal as an alternative 
way to think about how the criminal justice system might approach 
DV. My purpose in drawing the comparison is limited, however. I 
examine how another body of law has approached the problem 
posed by a discrete incident occurring within an ongoing, often 
complex relationship.214 I do not argue that DV law should share the 
normative goals of RCT—for example, to promote solidarity 
between contracting parties. Hence, the analogy is not complete. 
Nonetheless, several core tenets of RCT are useful to develop a less 
transactional, more relational approach to the prosecution of DV.  
IV. THE VALUE OF RELATIONAL THINKING IN THE PROSECUTION 
OF DV 
“Relational thinking” is the methodology of RCT. I begin this 
Part by explaining it. I then articulate, in Section B, its value in 
prosecutorial decision making—and in the scholarly debate 
surrounding prosecutorial decision making—by applying it to the 
 
not as exceptions to freedom of contract but as simply part of the law’s definition of 
contract.”).  
 212. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 56 (describing the inherent shifting of power in 
relations). 
 213. Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About 
the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 801 (2000). 
 214. In addition to Macneil’s thinking regarding coercion and undue influence, I was 
also inspired to look more closely at relational contract theory after reading Relational 
Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions A Symposium in Honor of Ian R. Macneil, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. (2000), particularly the article by Elizabeth Mertz, supra note 106, at 936, in which 
she asks: “Under what circumstances can and do courts usefully examine relational features of 
the underlying interaction in making decisions? As Macneil has noted, many modern 
interactions simultaneously inhabit extremes of discrete and relational characteristics; how, 
then, can scholars and courts most productively approach this combination? . . . [I]t seems 
possible that particular areas of law may converge in approach (if not in particular substance) as 
they grapple with similar relationships and concomitant legal problems” (citing as examples 
MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–30 (1995); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF 
RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991)). 
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facts of a case. I suggest solutions to DV that are more responsive to 
the victim’s relational context. I conclude, in Section C, by 
anticipating and addressing resistance to the import of relational 
thinking to DV prosecution. 
A. The Relational Method 
According to Macneil’s theory, exchanges exist on a relational 
spectrum, with relational at one end and discrete (or “as-if-
discrete”)215 at the other. The more discrete the exchange, the more 
a traditional, transactional legal approach may suffice.216 As applied 
to DV law, the less intertwined the parties, the more that the current 
legal response—that emphasizes only the most recent incident of 
violence and that seeks to separate parties—will suffice. But the more 
relational (or “intertwined”) the intimate relationship in which the 
violence takes place, the more the law must account for relational 
values.  
To determine where on the continuum an exchange falls, 
Macneil articulated a set of norms and behaviors through which the 
facts of a given case may be filtered.217  
1. Norms 
A brief summary of Macneil’s norms cannot possibly convey the 
intricacies and complexity of his theory. I therefore limit this 
discussion to those norms most pertinent to DV law, including what 
 
 215. Macneil, supra note 131, at 894–95 (stating that a discrete transaction is more 
accurately called an “as-if-discrete” transaction, because even those transactions that appear 
discrete are embedded in relations). 
 216. See MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 86; see also Mertz, supra note 106, at 915 (arguing 
that Macneil acknowledged that a transactional approach to analyzing contract should not be 
abandoned, but used sparingly, for even within a given relational contract there are discrete 
aspects that are still best dealt with by this approach).  
 217. Feinman, supra note 123, at 742. Macneil identified ten general norms that are 
present in any given exchange. These are: implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, 
role integrity, reciprocity, flexibility, solidarity, linking norms (restitution, reliance, 
expectation), creation and restraint of power, propriety of means, and harmonization with the 
social matrix. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 40; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal 
and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 347 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values]; Macneil, 
supra note 138, at 698–704. Some of these norms are more pronounced, or take on a different 
meaning, as the exchange moves toward the relational end of the continuum. MACNEIL, supra 
note 135, at 64–70. The relational norms are: preservation of the relations, maintenance of 
role integrity, harmonization of relational conflict, and supra-contract norms.  
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Macneil calls the “relational norms,” and provide specific examples 
of how these norms are relevant to understanding DV.  
 a. Preservation of the relations. In relational contracts, the parties 
expect that the relations will continue indefinitely.218 Marriage is 
perhaps the clearest example of a relational contract; so too are most 
employment contracts. Preserving the relationship is therefore a 
prominent value, unlike in discrete transactions, in which the parties 
expect that specific performance will terminate the relationship.219 As 
discussed in Part II.C, in the context of DV, preservation of the 
intimate relationship is the pronounced norm for many victims of 
DV, for a range of reasons, from safety to economic inter-
dependence to love.  
Preservation of the relations involves solidarity.220 Solidarity, in 
RCT, refers to the interest that each party has in the welfare or well-
being of the other party.221 Victims of DV report many concerns for 
the welfare of their partners. A victim may fear that her partner 
would be harmed through involvement with the criminal justice 
system.222 This fear may be particularly prevalent among women 
whose partners are members of a racial minority.223 African-American 
victims may face tremendous pressure to resolve problems within 
their community and outside of the judicial system.224 Asian-
 
 218. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 66. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. Solidarity is what Macneil would call a general, rather than relational, norm; but 
because preservation of the relations is an expansion of solidarity, I include it in this discussion. 
 221. Id. at 40. 
 222. See Lauren Bennett et al., Systemic Obstacles to the Criminal Prosecution of a 
Battering Partner: A Victim Perspective, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 761, 769 (1999). 
 223. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (“Race and culture 
contribute to the suppression of domestic violence in other ways as well. Women of color are 
often reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among 
people of color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is 
frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized community ethic against public 
intervention, the product of a desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults on 
the public lives of racially subordinated people.”); see also Maguigan, supra note 170.  
 224.  See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 1256 (describing the political or cultural interests 
of the community being interpreted in a way that precludes full public recognition of the 
problem of domestic violence and how race adds another dimension to why the problem of 
domestic violence is suppressed within nonwhite communities: “People of color often must 
weigh their interests in avoiding issues that might reinforce distorted public perceptions against 
the need to acknowledge and address intracommunity problems.”); see also Goodmark, supra 
note 52, at 36–37 (discussing a generalized ethic among communities of color against public 
intervention in domestic violence cases). 
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American225 and Latina226 victims may face the same. Immigrant 
women face the additional risk of deportation of their partners 
because of their involvement with the criminal justice system.227 
A mother may not want to deprive the father of her children of 
his parenting time.228 Similarly, if the children have not been 
physically harmed, she may be reluctant to deprive them of his 
companionship, even at substantial danger to herself.229 As one 
woman stated: “I may have to leave. But if I do, I’m giving up on a 
father for the children, and I’m giving up on him. And I can’t just 
throw away those nine years. . . . I’m not going to do it lightly.”230 
Finally, a DV victim may feel solidarity with the batterer against the 
state’s child protection agency, for she may accurately fear that the 
children are in jeopardy of removal from both parents as a result of 
the DV perpetrated on her.231  
b. Role Integrity. Role integrity refers to the idea that in a 
relationship, each party has a role to play, or a pattern of behavior 
expected of her by the other party.232 In more relational exchanges, 
roles grow in duration and the range of obligations that they impose, 
so that role integrity means more than simply keeping the role 
honest but also acts as a foundation for future reliance and 
 
 225. Sujata Warrier, (Un)Heard Voices: Domestic Violence in the Asian-American 
Community 10 (2002), http://endabuse.org/userfiles/file/ImmigrantWomen/ 
UnheardVoices.pdf. 
 226. Coker, supra note 74, at 1019. 
 227. See Goodmark, supra note 52, at 37 (discussing the risk of deportation to both the 
victim and the batterer that results from a victim obtaining a CPO). 
 228. Buel, supra note 73, at 938 (“We may believe that our children’s interest is best 
served by having both parents raise them . . . .”); Dutton, supra note 73, at 1234 (1993) 
(describing concern for the children as a factor leading women to remain in violent 
relationships, “believing that to separate the children from their father may be detrimental to 
the children.”); Mahoney, supra note 66, at 17 (“Battered women interviewed by social 
workers often say they felt a responsibility to support their children’s relationship with their 
father because ‘he’s really good with the children.’” (citations omitted)).  
 229. Buel, supra note 72, at 938; see also Mahoney, supra note 66, at 20–21 (Mahoney 
also notes, however, that “our social and legal doctrines increase the cost of her loyalty by 
viewing her attempt to fulfill this responsibility as problematic ‘staying’ in the relationship”). 
 230. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 21. 
 231. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (class action 
lawsuit on behalf of battered mothers whose children were removed by the state for mothers’ 
alleged engagement in domestic violence when mothers were in fact the victims of domestic 
violence); see also Goodmark, supra note 52, at 26–27 (describing the child protection system’s 
increased involvement in DV cases, the Nicholson case, and the reporting of DV cases involving 
children to police and prosecutors). 
 232. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 40–41. 
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expectation.233 In exchanges that are more discrete, where parties are 
only interested in a specific transaction, the role of each is limited to 
maximizing his own gain.234  
In the context of DV, examples of victims’ roles discussed in the 
literature include the role of care taker: women are socialized to care 
for others and to make decisions around what is best for others.235 A 
mother’s love for her child should overcome all “physical, financial, 
emotional and moral obstacles.”236 As Nina Tarr explained, 
[A] mother may stay in an abusive relationship because she does 
not see alternatives which provide for a “family.” Her constructed 
image of what a life is “supposed to be” may include a male in the 
home, regardless of his behavior. Accordingly, she may . . . 
perpetuate the illusion for . . . her children, and for the outside 
world that everything is “okay.”237 
Young girls and women are trained to think of marriage and 
family as the measure of success and to keep the marriage together, 
no matter what.238 This role—of maintaining the sanctity of the 
family—is in direct opposition to the justice system’s emphasis on 
separation as a solution to DV.239  
c. Harmonization of Relational Conflict.240 This norm could be 
subsumed under “preservation of the relations,” because if conflict is 
unresolved the relationship could collapse.241 In a contract, one 
 
 233. Id. at 66. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2129–30 (1993). 
 236.  Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect 
Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 272, 290–91 (2001) (quotation omitted). 
 237.  Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 170 (2003); see also G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? 
Redefining, Reconstructing and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 
22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 93 (1999) (“[T]he socially constructed paradigm of mothering 
leaves no accommodation for the battered mother. Within this construct, the ‘good mother’ is 
selfless and deferential. The needs and desires of fathers and children define her existence. The 
‘bad’ or ‘evil’ mother is one who insinuates her independent self into the familial picture, 
permitting her needs to co-exist with those of familial members.” (citation omitted)). 
 238. SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 19 (describing women’s role as ensuring tranquility 
in the family); SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 77 (“Women have been socialized to stay in the 
family—to keep the family together no matter what.”). 
 239. Evan Stark, Remarks, Violence Against Mothers, Violence Against Children: Law, 
Morality and Conceptions of State Accountability (Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with author).  
 240. Macneil, Values, supra note 217, at 350. 
 241. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 67. 
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party’s bad conduct could lead to a suit for breach or termination of 
the contract. But when parties seek to protect the relationship, they 
resolve, ignore, or suppress the conflict. They seek solutions shy of 
litigation, such as informal conflict resolution, mediation, and ADR.  
In the context of DV, the norm of harmonization is reflected in 
many victims’ desires for the violence, rather than the relationship, to 
end242 and in the many strategies that victims employ to preserve the 
relationship, to stay safe. Leaving is one such strategy, but short of 
permanently leaving, there are countless others, including leaving 
temporarily; accessing shelter services; calling the police; 
participating in support groups; seeking help from friends, 
neighbors, clergy, an employer or a lawyer; or working out a safety 
plan, and more.243 Lee Bowker’s study of victims who remained with 
their partners found that victims’ threats to leave the relationship 
were particularly effective as a strategy for ending the violence.244 
Victims in Lenore Walker’s renowned work reported the same.245 
Successful strategies that end the violence by methods shy of 
permanently leaving are often obscured, however, by the system’s 
emphasis on permanent separation as the solution to DV.246  
d. Harmonization with the social matrix. This norm is part of 
harmonization with the relational conflict in discrete exchanges, but 
becomes its own norm as the exchange becomes more relational.247 
It addresses the need to account for external relationships affected by 
the parties’ exchange. Macneil gives this example: a contract between 
 
 242. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 243. See generally Goodman et al., supra note 191 (creating a research instrument to 
measure the nature and extent of battered women’s strategic responses to violence in the 
context of a longitudinal study of battered women’s experience over time). 
 244. BOWKER, supra note 201 (surveying 1,000 community women regarding the 
strategies they employed to stay safe while in the relationship); id. at 75–85 (examining 
informal help seeking strategies).  
 245. WALKER, supra note 193, at 33 (documenting battered women’s reports that the 
single most effective strategy to stopping a particular incident of violence is a credible threat to 
leave). 
 246. See Martha Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and 
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC 
ABUSE 59, 77 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (“The women in 
Bowker’s study are the success stories that become invisible in studies of recurrent violence. 
Their actions tracked the actions of many battered women. . . . Women who ‘succeed’ in 
stopping violence without permanently leaving the relationship have made decisions that are 
not treated as legitimate or intelligent in women who ‘fail’ to halt the violence of their 
lovers.”). 
 247. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 69. 
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the administration of a law school and an individual faculty member 
must account for the relations between the administration and other 
faculty members, the relations between faculty members themselves, 
and the relations between the administration, faculty members, and 
alumnae.248 This norm acknowledges that in more relational 
exchanges, relations with the outside world become more complex, 
and more important.249 As discussed in Part II.C., in the context of 
DV, victims consider the impact on numerous external relations 
(such as the children, the couple’s friends in common, and the in-
laws) when determining how best to cope with violence. 
In addition to these relational norms, Macneil posited that other, 
“general” norms exist in all exchanges.250 Most relevant to DV is 
creation and restraint of power.  
e. Creation and restraint of power. Power, inherent in the 
concept of exchange, is created and restrained both within the 
relationship and external of it.251 Power may be legal, economic, 
social, and political in nature.252 A batterer’s use of power and 
control is a defining element of relationships involving DV. The 
source of the batterer’s power, feminists argue, is rooted in a culture 
in which men have legal, economic, social, and political dominion 
over women, and in social conditions that produce and support 
violence against women.253 A victim of DV, like anyone, may use the 
law to regain power in her relationships. There is evidence that 
victims use the threat of arrest and prosecution for precisely this.254 
The victim may want to send her partner a message that she will not 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. These norms are as follows: linking norms (restitution, reliance, expectation), 
MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 52–53; propriety of means (generally refers to whatever means 
are necessary and appropriate to accomplish what the parties agreed upon), Macneil, Values, 
supra note 217, at 360–61; flexibility (the capacity to change as the relation becomes broader 
in scope, duration, and increased personal involvement), MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 50–51. 
The two “discrete norms” are implementation of planning, in acknowledgment that planning 
is a significant part of modern contract law and effectuation of consent, which encompasses the 
idea that every choice involves the sacrifice of an alternative. See id. at 47–48.  
 251. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 56. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Miccio, supra note 19, at 249. 
 254. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
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tolerate the abuse.255 Or she may want—and be able to successfully 
obtain—child custody, parenting time, child support or other 
material resources that the threat of criminal prosecution, but not 
conviction, can get her.256  
2. Behaviors 
In addition to the above-described norms, Macneil articulated a 
set of behaviors that can be examined in conjunction with the 
norms.257 Generally speaking, relatively discrete exchange behaviors 
involve “short duration, limited party interactions, and precise 
measurement of the value of the objects exchanged.”258 There is little 
planning for the future, because the transaction itself is the sum total 
of the exchange.259 Transactional contracts tend to commence and to 
end sharply.260 Being finished and not finished are clearly defined.261 
Obligations are explicitly expressed.262  
More relational exchanges extend over time, so that parts of the 
contract “cannot be easily measured or precisely defined at the time 
of contracting,” and the interdependence of the parties reaches 
beyond the contract to a range of social interactions that others may 
support or rely on.263 There is extensive planning for the future, and 
particularly planning processes to deal with anticipated but 
unforeseen events and conflict.264 The relation rarely commences 
sharply, and termination tends to be gradual, if the relation fades 
away at all.265 Some of the parties’ obligations are explicitly 
 
 255. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 92 (describing how a victim called the 
police to “communicate clearly that although she was willing to give him another chance, she 
would not tolerate any future violence in the relationship”). 
 256. See, e.g., David A. Ford, Wife Battery and Criminal Justice: A Study of Victim 
Decision-Making, 32 FAM. REL. 463, 469 (1983); see infra Part IV.B. 
 257. Macneil, Values, supra note 217, at 345–46 (explaining that the norms and 
behaviors are so connected that they should be analyzed together). 
 258. Feinman, supra note 127, at 1301 & n.75. 
 259. Macneil, supra note 138, at 754. 
 260. Id. at 753. 
 261. Id. at 750. 
 262. Id. at 784. 
 263. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823–24 (2000). 
 264. Macneil, supra note 138, at 761–63, 805. 
 265. Id. at 750–53. 
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expressed, but many are not specific and are generated by the 
relation itself.266  
In the context of DV, these behavioral descriptions are helpful to 
understand the circumstances in which a legal approach that treats 
DV as episodic, and that views separation as a solution, may be a 
better or worse fit. For example, in cases in which the parties are not 
involved in a committed relationship, have not been together for a 
substantial period of time, or do not intend to stay together, a 
“sharp-out” approach, such as the immediate issuance of a no-
contact restraining order, is appropriate. In cases in which the parties 
have been involved in a long term relationship, or in which they are 
married or live together, or in which there is a continuing need or 
desire for contact, such as when they have children in common, a 
solution should contemplate future contact and mechanisms for 
dealing with future conflict. In Part IV.B.2, I suggest alternatives to 
the criminal justice system’s current “sharp-out” approach. I turn 
first, however, to the application of Macneil’s norms and behaviors 
to DV prosecution.  
B. The Value of the Relational Method to Prosecutorial                   
Decision Making 
1. Identifying the relational values that impact a case 
Laws applied to DV tend to treat it as an episodic crime.267 A 
prosecutor’s approach is shaped by this episodic conception. 
Prosecutors respond to the most recent, discrete incident that 
constitutes a violation of the criminal law.268 In their interactions 
with victims, they gather the information necessary to prove each 
 
 266. Id. at 785–86 & n.268 (“[C]onsider the obligation one brother may feel toward 
another brother . . . simply because of the obligations created through growing up together.”). 
 267. Typically the crimes that apply to DV include “assault, battery, burglary, trespass, 
disorderly conduct, property destruction, harassment, violation of a restraining order, 
intimidation of a witness, kidnapping, homicide, rape, sexual assault, and an attempt to commit 
any of these crimes.” Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at n.60; see SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 275–76 (2008). These crimes are 
“transaction-bound.” See Gerald E. Lynch, Rico: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & 
IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 932–33 (1987); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at 971 
(“Laws applied to prosecute domestic violence are generally characterized by a narrow 
temporal lens and a limited conception of harm.”); Burke, supra note 162, at 561. 
 268. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 467 (“[P]rosecutors typically approach cases with a 
short-term focus: How should the government respond to the perpetrator's most recent 
violation of the criminal law?”). 
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element of the statutory definition of the crime.269 Information 
about the relationship is unnecessary to assess the strength of the 
case.270  
According to Macneil, assessing both the discrete episode and 
the enveloping relationship is a better analytical choice than assessing 
the episode alone.271 This is because of the probability that the 
relational norms will impact the expected outcome of the case. In the 
prosecution of DV, the ultimate outcome—expected by prosecutors, 
judges, and other legal actors—is separation of the perpetrator and 
victim,272 as in cases of stranger violence. Without inquiry into the 
relationship, legal decision-makers miss, or misunderstand, critical 
information that might contraindicate separation as a realistic 
outcome.  
To illustrate, I draw from a case discussed by Cheryl Hanna in 
her seminal article, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions.273 Hanna, an ardent 
supporter of no-drop policies, described the case as illustrative of 
“the conflict between victim autonomy and a strong commitment to 
[the] criminal prosecution [of DV].”274  
When Hanna was a prosecutor, she was assigned a case in which 
Beverly Johnson was the victim.275 Johnson called the police to her 
 
 269. Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at 977 (describing a typical interview between a 
prosecutor and a victim of domestic violence: “[T]he content of the interview is framed by the 
statutory definition of the crime of assault. The prosecutor assesses the strength of the case by 
focusing on how each element of the crime charged will be proven—and on defeating any 
possible defenses—should the case ultimately go to trial. What happened in the time period 
immediately preceding the incident is relevant to the prosecutor; what happened in the weeks, 
months or years preceding it is not.”). 
 270. In states that have separate domestic violence offenses, the law requires proof of the 
intimate or familial relationship. Prosecutors would thus need to gather information to prove 
the existence of the relationship. But they would need no further information regarding the 
relationship, because these states’ statutes largely replicate the episodic paradigm of stranger 
crimes. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 160, at n.60 (citing Neal Miller, A Review of State 
Domestic Violence-Related Legislation: A Law Enforcement and Prosecution Perspective, INST. 
FOR LAW AND JUSTICE (2000)).  
 271. Macneil, supra note 131, at 891 (“Relational contract theory advances the 
proposition that it is both more efficient and more sure to engage in combined contextual 
analysis of relations and transactions than to commence with noncontextual analysis of 
transactions.”). 
 272. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 273. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1873–74. 
 274. Id. at 1874. 
 275. Id. at 1873 n.118 (noting that the victim’s name was changed in the article to 
protect her identity). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:13 PM 
515 Private Relationships and Public Problems 
 563 
home, and when they arrived they observed swelling on her face and 
arms.276 Johnson told the police that her boyfriend had beaten her, 
and the police arrested him.277 When she later met with Hanna, 
Johnson explained that she did not want her boyfriend prosecuted, 
despite the fact that he had abused her throughout the 
relationship.278 She said that she had AIDS and that it was the stress 
produced by her illness that caused the boyfriend to hit her.279 
Johnson said that she was afraid that her family would discover she 
had AIDS, that she and her boyfriend were working out their 
problems, and that she felt that she would die soon and did not want 
a criminal case to interfere with her life.280 She stated: “You’re 
making things worse, not better,” and begged Hanna not to pursue 
the case.281  
Hanna eventually decided not to pursue charges, “with a stern 
warning” to Johnson that she “would reopen it if her boyfriend laid 
a finger on her.”282 Hanna did not indicate whether relational factors 
influenced her decision. She noted, however, that many judges and 
prosecutors alike reason that: “[I]f the woman wants to live in a 
violent relationship, it is her choice.”283 Of her decision to dismiss, 
Hanna wrote that it “focused on the individual woman and relied on 
a choice to preserve her privacy . . . .”284  
Without investigating the relationship, how did Hanna reach the 
conclusion that Johnson wanted to live in a violent relationship? 
How did she reach the conclusion that this was a case about privacy? 
Without an understanding of at least some of Johnson’s relational 
values, it is impossible to know whether such conclusions are 
accurate. 
One other legal scholar—also a law professor and former 
prosecutor—has written about the Johnson case. She interpreted the 
case differently than did Hanna. Kris Miccio argued that the case was 
not about privacy, but about safety.285  
 
 276. Id. at 1873. 
 277. Id. at 1873–74. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Miccio, supra note 19, at 306. 
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Johnson made the decision to cease prosecution to preserve her 
health and her relationships—not only with her boyfriend but also 
with her family. Here, safety was associated with Johnson’s 
conditions particular to AIDS and not the violence  perpetrated by 
the boyfriend. Johnson’s decision was strategic. . . . It was a 
decision based on the conditions that shaped Johnson’s 
environment, with AIDS taking center stage.286 
Miccio begins to consider the relational context. She considers 
Johnson’s desire to preserve her relationships. She explicitly links 
that value to Johnson’s safety. But how can one know with such 
certainty, given the facts presented, that Johnson’s reluctance to 
prosecute was about safety? Especially in light of Johnson’s 
disclosure that her boyfriend abused her during, indeed throughout, 
the relationship? 
If Johnson’s decision was motivated by love (for example), rather 
than safety, it should matter to legal scholars writing about how the 
justice system should address DV. A victim’s decision to stay in a 
relationship that is dangerous may implicate much more than safety. 
It may implicate love, along with a range of other relational values. 
Many victims do not want to be in a position to “just leave” their 
intimate relationships.287 A legal policy that wins for victims the right 
to do so—a “sharp-out” approach, in RCT terms—misses this point. 
A victim may know that her decision to preserve her relationship 
puts her in danger. She may nonetheless choose love, or some other 
relational value, over safety.  
Returning to the conclusions drawn by Hanna and Miccio, both 
scholars may be right. Johnson’s decision may have been motivated 
by both privacy and safety. But Hanna and Miccio also both may be 
wrong.288 RCT offers a systematic approach to the discovery of 
relational factors designed to “lead the lawmaker or law-user to 
consider the things needing consideration.”289 Macneil calls for a 
“relational-first” rather than “transactional-first” analysis. Starting 
with the relations forces legal actors to analyze the relational 
 
 286. Id. at 306–07. 
 287. Baker, supra note 81, at 1474. 
 288. For another example of a conclusion about a victim’s relational values, without an 
investigation of them, see Hanna, supra note 95, at 93 (arguing generally that aggressive 
prosecution is appropriate because victims should not bear the responsibility of ending a “less 
than perfect relationship”). 
 289. Macneil, supra note 138, at 813–14 (speaking of transactional contract doctrines 
and not DV policy). 
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components of a case as a theoretical requirement, rather than as 
incidental to analyzing the transaction.290  
Continuing with the Johnson case, let us imagine the relational 
investigation that could have been conducted, using Macneil’s 
norms.  
 a. Preservation of the relations. Johnson explicitly expressed her 
desire to preserve her relationship with her boyfriend. Why she held 
this value is less clear. Perhaps she loved her boyfriend. Perhaps she 
was fearful of him. Maybe the boyfriend threatened to hurt her or 
her family if she did not drop the case. Maybe Johnson wanted to 
maintain the relationship for the sole reason that she was fearful that 
he would disclose that she had AIDS.291 Perhaps she was covered 
under his health insurance policy. Maybe she struck a deal with him 
that in exchange for dropping the case he would not drop her from 
his insurance plan. Or maybe the couple had been together for ten 
years and there was too much at stake for Johnson to leave the 
relationship, particularly in light of her illness. 
A prosecutor could inquire how long the couple had been 
together, how serious they were, what the victim’s feelings were for 
her partner, whether they lived together, whether they had children 
together, and whether they jointly owned property. These are just a 
few factual circumstances that would uncover the extent to which 
the couple was intertwined. She could ask explicitly what Johnson’s 
goals were with regard to the future of the relationship. Did she 
intend to continue the intimate relationship with him? Was it 
important merely to preserve a friendship with him? 
What were the boyfriend’s relational values? From Johnson’s 
perspective, did he intend to continue the relationship with her? Did 
he love her? Did he believe that she loved him? Did he threaten her? 
Does he continue to threaten her? Does he threaten to disclose that 
she has AIDS? What does he tell Johnson about the relationship? 
 
 290. Macneil, supra note 131, at 890 (describing how a transactional approach starts at 
the “‘wrong’ end in relational terms” because it means acquiring knowledge of relational 
factors only for “practical necessity rather than a theoretical requirement”). 
 291. Perhaps Johnson did not care about preserving her relationship with her family. 
Perhaps she simply did not want her diagnosis disclosed to them. For an interesting article 
arguing that some victims stay in violent relationships due to the batterer’s threats to divulge 
personal information, see Laurie S. Kohn, Why Doesn’t She Leave? The Collision of First 
Amendment Rights and Effective Court Remedies for Victims of Domestic Violence, 29 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (2001). 
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Was Johnson concerned about what might happen to the 
boyfriend if he was prosecuted? In RCT terms, was there solidarity 
between Johnson and her boyfriend? Perhaps Johnson thought that 
her boyfriend would be harmed or mistreated by the police. Perhaps 
she thought that, if prosecuted, he would receive a lengthy jail 
sentence. 
 b. Harmonization with the social matrix. Johnson’s desire to 
preserve a relationship outside of the primary relationship with her 
boyfriend—a.k.a. harmonization with the social matrix—also appears 
to have been a significant relational norm. Who does Johnson mean 
by family? What are those relationships like? How close is she with 
them? Why is it important to her to preserve those relationships? 
How well does her boyfriend know her family? Do they consider him 
a part of the family? Does he consider himself part of the family? In 
Johnson’s case, preserving the external relationships may have been 
more important than preserving the primary relationship with the 
boyfriend. 
 c. Harmonization of the relational conflict. Johnson stated that 
she and her boyfriend were working out their problems. She stated 
that Hanna was making things worse, not better. Did Johnson mean 
that the boyfriend was continuing to assault her because of the 
looming possibility of prosecution? Did she mean that things with 
him were tense? Did she mean that the couple could not move past 
the incident of violence? Or was there too much at stake in the 
relationship for Johnson to just leave?  
 d. Creation and restraint of power. Johnson called the police on 
the night of the incident because she needed immediate protection 
from her boyfriend. The police arrested him. By calling the police, 
she both created power for herself and restrained the power of her 
boyfriend. Does she now want to give up that power? If so, why? 
Perhaps the arrest alone was sufficient to restore a balance of power 
in the relationship. Perhaps Johnson’s boyfriend fears the possibility 
of being arrested again, and thus arrest acted as a sufficient deterrent. 
Alternatively, perhaps the arrest angered the boyfriend to such a 
degree that he re-assaulted Johnson, and she fears that he will do so 
again if the case is prosecuted. 
Macneil’s project of describing and analyzing relations has been 
likened to peeling an onion: “It is as if contract is the center of an 
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onion and Macneil is trying to study all the surrounding layers but 
always with the assumption that contract lies at the core.”292  
In the context of no-drop prosecution, Epstein proposes a model 
that also might be characterized as the peeling of an onion, at the 
core of which is a proactive victim.293 The layers of the onion—or 
concentric circles, in the words of the authors—are the factors that 
influence the strategies that the victim employs to cope with the 
violence.294 These include individual, relational, community, 
institutional, and cultural factors.295 Cutting across all of the circles is 
the socio-economic status of the victim.296 Epstein’s ecological 
factors are consistent with Macneil’s relational norms. Their impact 
on the outcome of the case must be assessed and accounted for. It is 
to that endeavor that this discussion now turns. 
2. Assessing the impact of relational values on the outcome of the case 
Macneil argues that after the legal actor has considered the 
relational values, he should explain why he has concluded that these 
values will not significantly affect the outcome of the case.297 In this 
section, I address potential case outcomes in a narrow sense, from 
the perspectives of an individual prosecutor and an individual victim. 
In Part IV.C., I address the import of case outcomes on a broader 
level, examining the goals of prosecution beyond the individual case. 
 
 292. Fox, supra note 7, at 21. 
 293. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 472. 
 294. Id. Macneil’s theory has also been described as “concentric circles of exchange 
relations.” Fox, supra note 7, at 39. 
 295. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 472. (“That first circle represents the individual 
level (e.g., the woman’s mental and physical health); the second represents the relational level 
(e.g., her relationship with her partner, family members, and friends); the third circle represents 
the community level (e.g., religious, work-related, ethnic, and neighborhood communities); 
the fourth represents the institutional level (e.g., the woman’s perceptions of the police, the 
court, and other potential help sources); and the outermost circle represents cultural 
identification and beliefs (e.g., religion and ethnic identity).”). 
 296. Id.  
 297. Macneil, supra note 131, at 885 (“[E]ven a modest . . . analysis calls for at least the 
following: (1) a statement that this is an area of extremely complicated . . . relations; (2) a brief 
description of these relations with suggestions, where available and appropriate, of further 
sources of information; (3) an explanation of why the analyst has concluded that the relations 
will not affect the outcome of his or her . . . study; and (4) a conclusion that ceteris paribus is 
therefore appropriate in such a case and constitutes adequate consideration of these relational 
impacts.”). 
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At the individual level, there are two immediately expected 
outcomes, from the prosecutor’s point of view, in any given DV 
case. One is the successful legal disposition of the case, whether it is 
in the form of a conviction, a plea, or the defendant’s agreement to 
the issuance of a protection order. Another is the separation of the 
defendant and the victim.298 In the Johnson case, how might the 
relational norms and values impact the immediate disposition of the 
case, and the longer term goal of separation?  
With regard to a successful legal disposition, from the vantage 
point of the prosecutor, perhaps not at all. Beverly Johnson might 
have refused to show up or testify at trial, or she might have testified 
but recanted her earlier statement. But there was sufficient evidence 
to proceed with or without Johnson’s support. A police officer could 
have testified to seeing swelling on Johnson’s face and arms; a 
recantation could have been impeached with Johnson’s prior 
statements. When there is sufficient evidence to proceed without the 
victim’s cooperation,299 considering her relational values is 
unnecessary to dispose of the case successfully. For this reason, some 
prosecutors prefer proceeding without the victim.300  
With regard to separation as an expected case outcome, however, 
a different picture emerges. Here the relational values have 
tremendous impact. For example, Johnson may have continued 
seeing her boyfriend, despite the existence of a protection order 
restraining him from contacting her. Such a situation is not 
uncommon, as Suk has persuasively argued, and it wreaks chaos, 
subjecting the defendant to criminal liability and in some 
jurisdictions, subjecting the victim to criminal liability for aiding and 
abetting the crime of violating a protection order.301 
It wreaks other havoc. If the partner commits another act of DV, 
the victim may be reluctant to call the police or turn to the legal 
system for help. She may feel that the system is unresponsive to her 
 
 298. See discussion supra Part II.B. and notes 58–61. 
 299. This is an example of “victimless” or “evidence-based” prosecution, characterized as 
the “state of the art” means of prosecuting DV cases, at least prior to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Crawford v. Washington. Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence 
and the Supreme Court: The Case for Cautious Optimism, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 22, 23 (2006), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
assets/fi/105/meier.pdf. 
 300. Kohn, supra note 291, at 33–49 (describing prosecutors who prefer that victims not 
be involved with prosecution because it makes their jobs easier). 
 301. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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individual needs, as evidenced by a prosecutor’s decision to proceed 
with charges that she did not support. She may feel that she is at 
fault or undeserving of help because she has continued the 
relationship despite the prosecution and protection order. This fear is 
realistic. In some jurisdictions, police may be less likely to respond to 
her call or less likely to find probable cause to arrest, concluding that 
the victim is partly at fault for the violence. They may find the victim 
to be untrustworthy. Or they may simply feel frustrated with her. 
For relationships that have been ongoing for a significant 
number of years, where parties have children in common and are 
financially intertwined, and for relationships in which relational 
values and behaviors indicate the desire to preserve and harmonize 
both the intimate relationship and all of the relationships connected 
to it, RCT suggests that a “sharp out” approach is unrealistic. RCT, 
as applied to the prosecution of DV, suggests an alternative method 
of structuring a case outcome, one that revolves around the 
seriousness of the relations and not just the seriousness of the violent 
incident. 
Scholars opposing aggressive no-drop policies have suggested 
numerous alternative outcomes. These include the issuance of a 
protection order, but one that is short in duration, to provide the 
victim the space to consider whether she values the connection with 
her partner as much as she thinks she does. Prosecutors could more 
narrowly tailor the substance of the protection order to prohibit the 
defendant from harassing, threatening, or assaulting the victim, but 
not to prohibit him from contacting her.302 Prosecutors may consider 
delaying prosecution or offering deferred sentencing in a broader 
range of cases.303  
Another alternative, but one that has received little scholarly 
attention, is that proposed by David Ford. Ford argued that victims 
use the threat of prosecution as leverage with violent partners and as 
a means of managing the violence in their relationships.304 This is 
directly analogous to Macneil’s proposal that parties use contract law 
 
 302. See Coker, supra note 12, at 105 (suggesting remedies currently available in 
restraining orders, but that include additional terms like an affirmative agreement to express 
anger in a noncontrolling, nonthreatening way). Goldfarb suggests this type of narrow 
tailoring in the context of civil protection orders. Goldfarb, supra note 52, at 1532–38. 
 303. Goldfarb, supra note 52, at 1508–09. 
 304. David A. Ford, Prosecution As a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering 
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 316–19, 327 (1991). 
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to create—and restrain—power in relations. Ford proposed that 
prosecution could be an effective “power resource” for a victim.305 
But significantly, it can only be a power resource to the extent that 
the victim can control the manner in which it is brought to bear.306 
The victim must be able to show her partner that she is committed 
to prosecution and that her threat is credible, and she must be able 
to withdraw that threat.307 
Prosecutors could act in alliance with victims in their 
negotiations to keep the victims safe.308 Indeed, the threat of 
prosecution may prove to be more significant than actual 
prosecution. A victim could use the threat to bargain for outcomes 
that might be more advantageous to her, or even impossible to 
obtain, through a criminal prosecution.309 
In my experience representing DV victims in civil protection 
order cases over the past thirteen years, I observed (and often 
assisted) victims as they bargained for and entered into agreements 
with their partners or ex-partners “in the shadow of the law.”310 For 
example, a victim might offer to give up relief she is legally entitled 
to in the case, such as child support, to get in return relief she might 
not be entitled to, such as her partner’s promise to transport the 
child to and from school each day.311  
RCT explicitly assumes that parties will enter into agreements 
that restrict their freedom for the purpose of pursuing their own 
ends—to create more choices, later.312 An agreement between a 
 
 305. Id. at 314. 
 306. Id. at 317. 
 307. Id. at 317–18. 
 308. Id. at 318 (“For a woman, [prosecution] may be an effective means of deterring her 
partner’s violence when invoked in alliance with committed agents of criminal justice.”). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (developing a “framework within which to 
consider how the rules and procedures used in court . . . affect the bargaining process that 
occurs . . . outside the courtroom,” i.e. “bargaining in the shadow”). 
 311. See Mahoney, supra note 66, at 47–49 (describing a woman who dropped her civil 
protection order case in exchange for her husband dropping his child custody case). See 
generally Randy Frances Kandel, Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learn from the 
Way Divorcing Couples Use Protective Orders as Bargaining Chips in Domestic Spats and Child 
Custody Mediation, 48 S.C. L. REV. 441 (1997). 
 312. Scott & Scott, supra note 139, at 1232; see also Macneil, Values, supra note 217, at 
356–57 (1983) (describing the value of enforcing the consequences of choices people freely 
make). I acknowledge that there is a significant divergence of opinion with regard to the 
nature and purpose of contracts and contract law, and that this divergence is prominent in the 
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victim and her partner in a civil protection order case might not be 
legally enforceable as a contract,313 and might never become part of 
the official order issued by the court—or even brought to the court’s 
attention—what Stewart Macaulay refers to as the difference between 
the “paper deal” and the “real deal.”314 Yet, it is a bargained for 
exchange borne out of the parties’ understanding of their obligations 
to each other, and out of DV law. 
Viewing DV within a larger exchange relationship has additional 
benefits. It more accurately reflects how victims view discrete 
incidents of DV.315 Research indicates that victims feel that there is a 
gap between how prosecutors view a case and how victims view a 
case. A careful investigation into the victim’s relational values is, in 
and of itself, a valuable intervention.316 For victims who feel 
ambivalent about the relationship or for victims who want the 
relationship to continue (but the violence to stop), the investigation 
indicates an interest in the relationship—and therefore the victim—
and a willingness by the prosecutor to work within the victim’s 
context.317 
 
opinions of scholars who write in support of and against RCT. See generally Dori Kimel, The 
Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on the Relational Model, 27 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 233 (2007). 
 313. For lack of consideration, given that the father of the child is legally required to pay 
child support to the custodial parent, regardless of whether this victim waived child support in 
the particular context of the civil protection order case. 
 314. Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44 (2003). 
 315. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 16 (describing women whom she interviewed and 
shared her own story with: “Women often discussed the relationship at length before they 
mentioned any violence. Finally, I began to understand that the violence against these women 
seemed shocking to me . . . precisely because we heard each others’ reports of violence isolated 
from the context of the marriages. . . . We resisted defining the entire experience of marriage 
by the episodes of violence that had marked the relationship’s lowest points.”); see also 
Goodmark, supra note 52, at 29 (describing the legal system’s myopic view of the narrow 
range of behaviors it defines as domestic violence and the disparity between this definition and 
the totality of women’s experiences of domestic violence). 
 316. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 470 (describing a prosecutor’s willingness to 
consider the layers of factors that affect her decision making: “[T]his focus on the victim in and 
of itself constitutes an intervention that may enhance her long-term safety by promoting her 
sense of autonomy and self-reliance, as well as her sense that others are on her side.”). See 
generally Mills, Affective Lawyering, supra note 40; Mills, Killing Her Softly, supra note 91. 
 317. See EVE BUZAWA, GERALD T. HOTALING, ANDREW KLEIN & JAMES BYRNE, 
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN A PROACTIVE COURT SETTING: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 13 (2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/181428.pdf (reporting 
that in a scale study, victims generally perceived a gap between their interests and prosecutors’ 
interests); see also Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 486 (arguing that the prosecutor’s 
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Indeed, as Mills argues, every positive contact between the 
prosecutor and the victim is a valuable intervention. The relationship 
between prosecutor and victim should be critical to prosecutors. 
Prosecutors themselves could function in a relational fashion. Pamela 
Karlan theorized the relationship between a criminal defense 
attorney and his client as a relational contract.318 While a prosecutor 
is not the victim’s attorney, his ability to transcend the transaction-
bound constraints of the criminal law is no less significant. By 
developing a relationship with the victim, becoming familiar with 
victim-specific concerns, and developing the norms of reciprocity, 
flexibility, and trust, the victim may feel encouraged to support 
prosecution319 and to seek assistance from the criminal justice system 
in the future should abuse recur. 
Perhaps most importantly, by developing a relationship with the 
victim, a prosecutor is in a better position to assess whether a victim 
who does not support prosecution has been coerced, or intimidated, 
by a batterer to drop the case.320 This assessment is complex.321 But, 
a victim who trusts the prosecutor assigned to her case may admit 
outright that she has been coerced to drop.322 Alternatively, she may 
 
“willingness to understand and work within this context” is critical to understanding the 
victim’s priorities and concerns and ultimately in increasing her long term safety). 
 318. Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing 
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 673 (1992). 
 319. Waits, supra note 32, at 307 (1985) (describing how helping a victim assess her 
situation may encourage her to act as a witness in the case). 
 320. Scholars are divided with regard to how a prosecutor should proceed if the victim is 
coerced. Some believe that no-drop is an answer to the problem of coercion because it takes 
away the batterer’s incentive to coerce the victim. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 34, at 1891. 
Others argue that when the state proceeds despite the victim’s wishes to the contrary, the state 
replicates the very coercion of the victim that it seeks to eradicate by taking complete control 
over the case, functioning as the sole decision-maker and ignoring victims’ voices. See Mills, 
supra note 91, at 566. 
 321. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 15 (noting that one reason for the reluctance of 
prosecutors to proceed with cases was their “claim[ ] that they could not distinguish between a 
battered woman who was communicating her true feelings and one who had a literal or 
figurative gun to her head”); Kuennen, supra note 206, at 14 (describing the “considerable 
obstacles” to determining if a batterer’s actions are coercive and arguing that “there are varying 
types and degrees of coercion that are difficult to ascertain” and that “[v]ictims’ decisions to 
drop their cases may be influenced by numerous external sources in addition to the batterer, 
and these influences must be distinguished”). 
 322. CAROLYN HOYLE, NEGOTIATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 171–74 (1998) (arguing 
that victims may feel intimidated for numerous reasons to drop cases, but that prosecutors 
“rarely make the necessary checks” to determine whether withdrawals are made voluntarily); 
id. at 172. 
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disclose that she wants the prosecution to proceed but feels it is 
unsafe to state this position in the presence of her partner.323 Or, she 
may explain that while her partner has threatened her with harm if 
she does not drop, she does not feel coerced by the threat because 
she does not believe it to be credible.324 Or, she may feel that her 
primary goal of exercising increased power in the relationship was 
satisfied by the act of calling the police, or successfully negotiating 
factors such as separation, child custody, and parenting time, as 
discussed above. A relational approach to prosecution would 
significantly enhance the prosecutor’s ability to obtain this 
information and to begin to assess the voluntariness of a victim’s 
reluctance to support prosecution.325 
C. Addressing Resistance to Importing Relational Values                     
into DV Prosecution 
In the context of effectively prosecuting DV, numerous 
objections have been raised to the consideration of a victim’s desire 
with regard to whether prosecution in a given case should proceed. 
These objections often fall into the categories of what prosecutors 
should do, and what prosecutors can do.326 
 
 323. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 17 (calling this type of victim withdrawal 
“performative withdrawal”); id. at 17 (arguing that in many cases when victims meet privately, 
face-to-face with prosecutors, they expressed their sincere desire that the prosecutor proceed 
with the case despite their stated desire, for the benefit of the defendant, that the case be 
dropped); id. at 20 (“In my experience, the majority of victims who withdrew support were, to 
my belief and understanding, entirely sincere in their request that the charges be dismissed.”); 
cf. Epstein, supra note 37, at n.62 (detailing an interview of a prosecutor in the District of 
Columbia who explained that after interviewing victims daily for six months, he could not 
distinguish between those victims who sought to drop charges because of a threat by the 
defendant and those who sought to drop for other reasons). 
 324. See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: 
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 748 (2005) (arguing that for a threat to 
be coercive, the batterer must communicate “the ability, willingness and readiness to control 
one’s partner” and the victim must “believe that, when it is threatened, the negative 
consequence will be delivered”). 
 325. Mills calls this relational approach “affective lawyering.” See generally Mills, supra 
note 40. 
 326. See, e.g., MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 15 (“It is important to distinguish 
between two questions that often arise in thinking about the prosecution of domestic violence 
without victim support: (1) can such cases be prosecuted? (2) should such cases be prosecuted? 
. . . Often these two questions become conflated in prosecutors’ thinking . . . .” (emphasis in 
original)); see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Why Criminalize Domestic Violence? Abstracts of 
Panelist’s Remarks, Symposium: Thinking Outside the Box: New Challenges and New 
Approaches to Domestic Violence, St. John’s University, Mar. 20, 2009 (“A fair characterization 
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1. Should the criminal justice system account for relational values? 
Michelle Madden Dempsey argues that prosecutors’ actions (to 
pursue or not to pursue a given case) realize values.327 Her 
categorization of these values into two types, consequential and 
intrinsic,328 provides a useful organizational tool. Examples of 
consequential values include conviction and punishment of the 
offender, prevention of DV generally, and increased safety of 
particular victims.329  
Although no-drop policies have increased the number of DV 
cases prosecuted, both the charges filed and dispositions obtained are 
generally lenient.330 As discussed previously, prosecutors routinely 
negotiate pleas with defendants that include a reduction in charge, 
with little or no jail time, in exchange for the defendant’s consent to 
the continuance of a restraining order.331 In those cases in which 
 
of the responses I have encountered is: true, the criminal law does not respond to the realities 
of domestic violence, but perhaps need not, or should not, or cannot.” (emphasis in original)). 
 327. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 59 (describing prosecutorial actions as having 
the potential to realize myriad values, and identifying and organizing them to “understand 
more clearly the relationship between these values and the reasons they generate (or fail to 
generate) for prosecutors”).  
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 160. 
 330. See Hanna, supra note 47, at 1523 (describing lenient sentences and noting that 
“few batterers ever see the inside of a jail cell”). The New York District Attorney’s office is 
known as one of the most aggressive in the nation in prosecuting domestic violence cases. See 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 342. Yet even here, scholars note very lenient dispositions. See, 
e.g., Richard R. Peterson, Combating Domestic Violence in New York City, NEW YORK CITY 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY (2003) (comparing case outcomes between DV and non-DV 
misdemeanor cases found 72% of DV cases resulted in conditional discharge compared with 
47% of non-DV cases; only 17% accused of DV received a sentence that included jail compared 
with 45% of non-DV cases); see also Miccio, supra note 19, at 298 (describing sentences in 
New York as consisting largely of fines and conditional discharges rather than jail, concluding 
that “the data from New York challenges the notion that punish and protect are consistently 
part of a criminal justice repertoire” (citing N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS. & 
N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY PROTECTION 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: EVALUATION OF THE MANDATORY 
ARREST PROVISIONS, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (2001); 
CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE 
WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 180–83 (2000) (providing examples of judges and juries 
treating domestic violence cases with relative leniency))). 
 331. See Suk, supra note 47, at 54–55 (describing the process and substance of this type 
of plea bargain, and stating that this result “is so common that it is plausible to consider it a 
standard disposition sought by prosecutors.”); id. at 56 (describing the issuance of a criminal 
court protection order as a “phenomenon that is so routine in criminal court that it disappears 
in plain sight.”); KLEIN, supra note 47, at 55–57.  
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defendants are convicted, the charges are overwhelmingly 
misdemeanors.332  
One reason for this is that, despite aggressive anti-domestic 
violence laws, prosecutors are not always able to get juries to convict, 
and thus must use plea bargains to obtain convictions in the first 
place.333 The average juror may believe that some amount of violence 
within an intimate relationship is acceptable, and thus be disinclined 
to convict.334 Another reason is that criminal justice actors, despite 
mandatory policies, are more likely to view DV as technical, rather 
than real, violence.335 Dan Kahan argues that, in the case of DV, 
“legislative reforms reflected strong, feminist-inspired critiques of 
norms that had not yet been fully repudiated by society at large.”336 
When the law is much more condemnatory of a social norm than the 
average decision-maker tasked to enforce it, the decision-maker 
resists enforcing it.337 This, in turn, reinforces the very norm that 
lawmakers seek to change. Kahan calls this a problem of “sticky 
norms,”338 and describes DV as falling squarely within it.339 
 
 332. KLEIN, supra note 47, at 55 (“[T]he vast majority of domestic violence defendants 
are prosecuted for misdemeanor assaults.”); Suk, supra note 47, at 44 (“[M]ost DV cases are 
misdemeanors.”).  
 333. See Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience of Presumptive 
Arrest and Prosecution, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 111, 123 (2008).  
 334. See id. As one state’s attorney stated: “It’s that . . . attitude that family problems 
should stay in the family, until they get to a certain point. If the jury believes it hasn’t gotten 
to that point, then leave them [suspects] alone.” Id. at 122; see also Murray A. Straus, Physical 
Violence in American Families: Incidence Rates, Causes, and Trends, in ABUSED AND 
BATTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 17, 27 (Dean D. Knudsen 
& JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991) (“The informal social norms have changed much less than the 
law has. Almost a third of American men and a quarter of American women perceive that it is 
normal for a husband or wife to slap the other ‘on occasion.’”). 
 335. Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality 
in the Statutory Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 701 (2005) (“Much of the available literature 
suggests that as the relationship between the parties moves toward the intimate end of the 
spectrum, criminal justice actors are more likely to regard the crime as technical rather than 
real, which produces a more lenient disposition.”).  
 336. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 629 (2000). 
 337. Id. at 607. 
 338. Id.  
 339. Id. at 628 (“When states enact mandatory arrest policies, police departments refuse 
to implement them. When states raise the penalties for repeat offenders, prosecutors drop 
cases, juries acquit, and judges refuse to sentence severely. When judges make nonabuse a 
condition of probation, probation officers look the other way . . . . Though not as prevalent as 
it once was, the view that occasional violence is a normal part of family life persists. Many 
decisionmakers either hold this view or empathize with individuals who do. Predictably, these 
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Recent interviews with defendants arrested for DV in a 
“presumptive prosecution” jurisdiction provide examples of the 
problem.340 Attorneys advised defendants that the state “does not 
drop” charges and almost always “take[s] the female[’s] side,”341 that 
the district attorney was female and was “going to crack down on 
domestic violence,”342 and that, despite the existence of a no-contact 
order, the defendant should “remain on good terms” with the victim 
so that the attorney could persuade her to drop the case.343 
Statements such as these give batterers the message that it is the 
system, and not the batterer’s conduct, that is to blame for the 
charges pending against them.344 As a result, batterers were not 
deterred from intimidating victims to drop charges; instead, they 
changed their tactics for so doing.345 The study concluded that 
mandatory practices “fail to fulfill their promise of increasing 
abusers’ responsibility for violence.”346  
Nor is there evidence to support the consequential value of 
keeping individual victims safer. Of the very few studies that compare 
recidivism in no-drop versus discretionary-drop jurisdictions, none 
 
decisionmakers refuse aggressively to enforce condenmatory [sic] domestic violence laws.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 340. Guzik, supra note 333. The study consisted of in-depth interviews of thirty persons 
arrested and prosecuted for domestic violence and is the first in which defendants were 
contacted for the purpose of understanding how the policies affect them. Id. at 112. 
 341. Id. at 132. 
 342. Id. at 127. 
 343. Id. at 125. 
 344. Id. (commenting that such statements send the message that the defendant did not 
do anything wrong, but rather that the legal system is overly strict or unjust); see also Deborah 
Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1843, 1870 & n.123–24 (2002) (observing that as mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies went into effect, the perpetrator population and their attorneys claimed 
unfair, discriminatory treatment, and documenting statements of defendants such as “that the 
‘system is against men,’ and that in responding to a ‘family matter,’ the police ‘always arrest 
the man’ and ‘judges always believe the woman’”); see id. at 1903 (“Perpetrators’ tendencies to 
attribute responsibility externally, make arbitrary inferences, and exaggerate negativity may be 
encouraged when their attorneys—correctly or incorrectly—articulate the position that the 
court system is biased and unfair.”). 
 345. Guzik, supra note 333, at 125 (describing tactics such as “trying to be nice,”  
“attempting to generate or play upon feelings of regret from their partners about their arrests,” 
and using family members to contact and pressure victims: “In these contexts of diminished 
power, abusers transformed rather than severed their forms of influence over their partners.”). 
 346. Id. at 136. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:13 PM 
515 Private Relationships and Public Problems 
 577 
conclude that no-drop enhances victim safety.347 Jeffrey Fagan 
concluded that, when compared with discretionary policies, no-drop 
policies increase the risk of re-abuse in cases in which men with prior 
arrests or lengthy histories of severe violence toward their partners.348 
Ford and Renzetti concluded that “contrary to popular advocacy, 
permitting victims to drop charges significantly reduces risk.”349
 Currently, batterers are being arrested and charged, but then 
their charges are reduced or dismissed. Instead of being punished, 
they are told to stay away. Instead of holding batterers accountable, 
system actors blame the system for the batterer’s arrest and 
prosecution. Batterers themselves blame the system. And there is no 
evidence to suggest that women are any safer.  
If consequential values are not realized by a policy that 
purposefully excludes consideration of relational values, perhaps 
“intrinsic values” are. An example of an intrinsic value is the 
expressive value of criminal prosecution, or its ability to send a 
message regarding the wrongful nature of particular conduct.350  
The expressive value of no-drop policies is one of the most 
widely recognized intrinsic values discussed in the scholarly 
debate.351 Supporters argue that one of the most important ways of 
ending violence against women is to ensure that batterers get the 
message that society will not tolerate their behavior.352 But sending a 
strong message, they argue, requires consistently sought, swift 
 
 347. I note, however, that one small study (sample size of eleven) conducted in Duluth, 
Minnesota, found that victims preferred no-drop policies to policies which allowed them to 
have some influence over the decision to prosecute. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting 
Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding 
the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 137 (1991) (“In interviews 
conducted with victims subpoenaed to testify against their partners . . . nine of eleven said they 
were relieved when they were told that they could not have the charges dropped, even though 
they never would have voluntarily testified.” (citing Duluth Abuse Intervention Project, Data 
Collection Files (1990))).  
 348. JEFFREY FAGAN, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 17 (1996). 
 349. See David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: 
Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND 
EVALUATION 157 (1993). 
 350. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 162. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1890. 
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punishment,353 that adheres to the underlying goals of the criminal 
justice system: to punish and deter.354  
But if consistently sought, swift punishment is not the norm in 
DV prosecutions, as above argued, perhaps the message sent by 
aggressive prosecution is illusory. As Katherine Baker notes: 
“Whatever norm or law tells men that battery is wrong is 
counteracted by gender norms that reaffirm their right to control 
and their partners’ duty to obey . . . . In order to attack the problem, 
therefore, the law needs to do more than just label domestic battery 
and rape wrong . . . .”355 
Battered women’s activists in the 1970s sought to use the 
criminal law to do just this—to change cultural perceptions about 
violence against women. They situated DV within a cultural 
paradigm and sought to alter the social conditions that created and 
supported intimate abuse.356 No-drop prosecution, like mandatory 
arrest, was a “corrective to a social system that refused to treat male 
intimate violence as offensive conduct and as criminal behavior.”357 It 
was one piece of the larger puzzle of changing cultural perceptions 
about violence against women.358  
Many feminist legal scholars acknowledge that the 
criminalization strategy did not affect the cultural shift that activists 
had hoped for.359 Not only that, it led to the unintended 
consequence of requiring victims to sever their relationships in 
exchange for getting the state’s help. This was not the goal of the 
 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 1870 (citing William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in 
ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 295, 295–96 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel, III eds., 1977)). 
 355. Baker, supra note 81, at 1488–89. 
 356. Miccio, supra note 19, at 249. 
 357. Id. at 265. 
 358. Id. at 249 (“In the lexicon of the early movement, what needed fixing was not the 
survivor but the culture.”). 
 359. Id. at 241 (“Ten years later, the quality of battered women’s lives, as well as 
society’s view of male violence, still needs redress.”); SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 113 
(observing the deep societal resistance to perceiving the circumstances of battered women as a 
problem of gender equality); id. at 230 (“Intimate violence has now been recognized as a 
‘public’ harm, but it is significant that this recognition is, in a sense, conditioned on a view that 
intimate violence is an individual problem, not a systemic or social one. . . . [O]ur culture 
wants a quick-fix explanation and denies the link to gender.”); Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: 
Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 817–20 
(2000) (arguing that criminalization of DV has obscured women’s sexual and financial 
subordination, the underlying problems that “lead to the need for criminalization”).  
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battered women’s movement. It sought to end violence in women’s 
lives, not to have them leave their relationships.360  
When considering the expressive value of no-drop policies, one 
may also wonder: what messages are sent to battered women? Laurie 
Kohn recently asked this question, and concluded that there are 
several.361 One potential message is that the system aggressively and 
proactively protects the victim.362 But this message, as Kohn notes, is 
not supported by empirical data. The message is therefore 
particularly troublesome; it gives victims a false sense of security and 
potentially leaves them in more, rather than less, danger.  
Kohn argued that at least two other potential messages are sent 
to victims. One is that victims cannot make rational, informed 
decisions about themselves, their families, and their futures.363 
Another is that criminal justice system actors are more capable than 
victims of making these decisions.364 Yet there is substantial evidence 
that victims are accurate predictors of future violence.365 Kohn 
concluded that because the messages vary to such an enormous 
degree based on context and perspective, they alone cannot justify 
the imposition of mandatory policies.366  
With regard to the message sent to society, some argue that 
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies have communicated that 
the state will respond to DV.367 But given the messages that no-drop 
 
 360. SUSAN SCHECHTER, EXPANDING SOLUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
POVERTY: WHAT BATTERED WOMEN WITH ABUSED CHILDREN NEED FROM THEIR 
ADVOCATES 8 (2000) (describing the historic goal of the battered women’s movement was “to 
end violence and coercion, not to have women leave their relationships”). 
 361. Kohn, supra note 26, at 240 (arguing generally that there is an inverse relationship 
between the seriousness with which the state treats DV cases and the seriousness with which it 
treats DV victims). 
 362. Id. at 240–41. 
 363. Id. at 240. 
 364. Id. at 241. 
 365. See D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Battered Women’s Perceptions of Risk 
Versus Risk Factors and Instruments in Predicting Repeat Reassault, 19 J. INTERPERS. VIO. 
778, 796 (2005); Donna Coker, supra note 98; Welch, supra note 98. 
 366. Kohn, supra note 26, at 244. 
 367. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 17; Epstein, supra note 34, at 1885 (mandatory 
policies have made gains “in sending a clear message of disapproval”); Ford & Regoli, supra 
note 99, at 128 (discussing the important symbolic shift); Lisa G. Lerman, The 
Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 224–25 
(1992) (“Even if a law enforcement approach fails to result in specific deterrence in some cases, 
enforcement of the law . . . sends an appropriate message to the community—that domestic 
violence is not acceptable.”); Miccio, supra note 19, at 240 (“One must not overlook the 
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sends (or fails to send) to batterers, the sticky norms problem that 
no-drop has created, the disempowering messages that no-drop 
sends to victims, and the lack of conclusive data that no-drop policies 
make victims safer, it is hard to make the case that the message has 
been received. 
2. Can the criminal justice system account for relational factors? 
Prosecuting DV is a “tall order.”368 Taking the victim’s relational 
values into account is doubly so. It requires prosecutors to consider a 
host of factors that hitherto they have been trained to ignore,369 not 
to mention the time it requires to gather this wide range of facts, 
listen to the victim, and think carefully about a hard-to-make 
decision. Applying Macneil’s relational method, rather than a rule 
such as no-drop, might slow down the criminal justice system to an 
objectionable extent.370 
While it is certainly the case that prosecutors have been trained 
to ignore victims’ relational values, they are hardly unqualified to 
conduct such an assessment. Battered women’s advocates have 
already successfully trained and collaborated with prosecutors to 
conduct individualized assessments of the underlying relationships 
enveloping incidents of DV. They have done so in the context of 
women who are arrested.  
For example, in Duluth, Minnesota, advocates work with the 
prosecutor’s office to establish a process through which victims of 
ongoing abuse charged with misdemeanor offenses against their 
abusers can obtain a conditional deferral, which sidetracks the cases 
and puts the defendants on a quasi-probation status for a year.371 
Instead of focusing on the incident of assault, prosecutors focus on 
the relationship behind the assault.  
 
radical and beneficial nature of mandatory [interventions]: They placed male intimate violence 
at the center of law enforcement policy by criminalizing conduct that the justice system and 
society previously had sanctioned.”). 
 368. DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 217. 
 369. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 92 (describing how anti-domestic violence 
legislation has trained state actors to assume that they cannot determine when a victim truly 
wants the case dropped or is being coerced into dropping).  
 370. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. 
L. REV. 786, 798 (1967) (arguing that when we have to mass process, we turn to quantitative 
rules, rather than asking a legal decision-maker to weigh and balance individual factors, for 
unlike a department store, for the legal system more business is not necessarily a good thing). 
 371. McMahon & Pence, supra note 161, at 67–68. 
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Similarly, in Tucson, Arizona, the prosecutor’s office operates a 
diversion program for immigrant victims of DV who are arrested.372 
DV victims’ advocates work closely with prosecutors who are 
specially trained to identify and recognize the particular forms of 
coercive control that abusive spouses use against immigrant 
victims.373 The case is held open during the pre-trial phase while the 
defendant undergoes counseling.374 Upon completion, the 
prosecutor dismisses the case and the defendant exits the system 
without a conviction on her record.375  
These examples demonstrate that victims’ advocates can train 
prosecutors to conduct an individualized assessment, and that 
prosecutors are willing to be trained. They also illustrate the fact that 
prosecutors’ offices can, and do, dismiss cases in which they could 
otherwise secure convictions. There is thus reason to believe that 
advocates and prosecutors can collaborate to find creative solutions 
in all cases.  
A prosecutor need not conduct a relational analysis on her own. 
Innovative collaborations between prosecutors, victims’ advocates, 
and victims’ civil attorneys are already in existence. In Washington, 
D.C., the “Victim Informed Prosecution Project” connects victims’ 
civil attorneys on civil protection order cases with the prosecutors in 
charge of the criminal cases for the purpose of giving the victim 
more voice in the prosecution.376 Civil attorneys who work in 
collaboration with prosecutors can provide victims with detailed 
information such as what charges the prosecutor is likely to bring, 
the types of plea offers he will make and his assessment of the 
likelihood of conviction.377 They can also relay to the prosecutor 
details such as the victim’s concerns about prosecution and can 
advocate with the prosecutor for an approach that accounts for these 
 
 372. See Harris, supra note 179.  
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Lauren Bennett Cattaneo et al., The Victim-Informed Prosecution Project: A Quasi-
Experimental Test of a Collaborative Model for Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 15 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1227 (2009). 
 377. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 496 (describing the information that civil attorneys 
can provide their clients, when those attorneys work as a team with prosecutors and advocates). 
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concerns.378 In Chicago, the “Target Abuser Call” program 
functions similarly.379  
Significantly, funding exists to support such collaborations. The 
Violence Against Women Act of 2005 reauthorized funding for 
grants supporting programs such as Victim-Informed Prosecution 
and Target Abuser Call.380 In addition, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed into law on February 17, 2009, 
provides to the Office on Violence Against Women $225 million, 
$140 million of which is designated for STOP (Services Training 
Officers Prosecutors Formula Grant Program) “to promote a 
coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to enhance services and 
advocacy to victims, improve the criminal justice system’s response, 
and promote effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to 
address domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault and 
stalking.”381  
I recognize that my optimism in the capacity of the criminal 
justice system to respond to DV—even with the incentivized trend 
toward community coordination and collaboration—may be naïve.382 
I am asking prosecutors to take into account a long list of factors by 
applying a relational approach. Even in the realm of contracts, 
 
 378. Id. 
 379. Bailey, supra note 45, at 49–51 (describing the collaboration between service 
providers, community advocacy groups, civil attorneys and prosecutors to include “the victim 
in the prosecution process by directly addressing the economic and safety needs that often 
make her reluctant to seek prosecution” and to provide “a supportive, cooperative 
environment that takes away any sense of alienation she might feel in the typical prosecution 
scenario”). 
 380. See Violence Against Women And Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960; see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009, signed into law on February 17, 2009, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ 
recovery/programs.htm., which provides to the Office on Violence Against Women $225 
million, $140 million of which is designated for STOP (Services Training Officers Prosecutors 
Formula Grant Program) “to promote a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to enhance 
services and advocacy to victims, improve the criminal justice system’s response, and promote 
effective law enforcement, prosecution, and judicial strategies to address domestic violence, 
dating violence, sexual assault and stalking.” See generally OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2004 BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (2004). 
 381. See United States Department of Justice, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/recovery.htm 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
 382. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 74, at 1039–40. (arguing that too much trust and 
reliance have been placed on a “coordinated community response” as a panacea); see also 
Römkens, supra note 68, at 161 (arguing that even in coordinated community responses, the 
prosecutor dominates).  
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scholars question legal actors’ abilities to do so.383  Notwithstanding 
these objections, proposing an approach to the prosecution of DV 
that does not account for the relational complexity inherent in 
domestic relationships will not work.384 As Macneil has stated, “This 
produces no trouble free-Eden, but it works. And relational contract 
law does not promise a rose garden, just freedom from the 
conceptual limitations of a discrete system.”385  
V. THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPLEMENT FEMINIST VALUES 
In this Part, I turn to what Christine Littleton calls the “problem 
of transition,”386 which refers to the tension amongst feminist legal 
scholars between taking seriously women’s actual experiences of no-
drop while simultaneously trying to maintain the little protection 
from male violence that the current law provides.387 I agree with 
those scholars who suggest that the problem need not be portrayed 
as a policy choice between “never drop” and “always drop,” and I 
suggest that the incorporation of relational principles may, in fact, 
provide an opportunity to implement feminist values through law.  
A. The Problem of Transition 
Feminist legal scholars appreciate the importance of relational 
context to DV law, as evidenced by their arguments in support of its 
analysis at virtually every stage of DV prosecution.388 They 
acknowledge that the relational context is critical to the victim’s 
decision to support prosecution: “What can be said of virtually every 
consideration militating against cooperation . . . is that each is rooted 
in the continuing relationship between the woman and the 
defendant. The victim’s decision making with regard to prosecution 
 
 383. See, e.g., Mertz, supra note 106, at 917 (describing the tension between those who 
articulate the desire for simplicity to produce more uniform and predictive results and what 
Macneil advocates—careful consideration of details). See generally RICHARD DANZIG AND 
GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW (2d. ed. 2004) 
(examining several famous contracts cases and discovering that, even when judges attempt to 
implement legal realism values, their capabilities of so doing are questionable). 
 384. See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 19, at 305 (describing the widespread criticism leveled at 
“one-size-fits-all” approaches to the prosecution of DV). 
 385. MACNEIL, supra note 135, at 77. 
 386. This term was coined by Christine Littleton. See Littleton, supra note 11, at 31, 47. 
 387. Id. at 47. 
 388. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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simply cannot be evaluated without reference to the context in which 
she remains embedded.”389 However, scholars are deeply divided 
whether prosecutors should consider context when deciding to 
proceed or dismiss DV cases. Both proponents and opponents of no-
drop fear a return to treating DV as a private matter rather than a 
crime.390 As Emily Sack recently asked, “Isn’t this where we were 
over twenty-five years ago?”391 
Activists have won legal reform favoring battered women by 
advocating that prosecutors ignore relational factors. No-drop 
prosecution policies have decreased the number of cases dismissed 
and brought prosecution rates in DV cases on par with stranger 
violence cases.392 These are remarkable accomplishments, given that 
thirty years ago both police and prosecutors refused to respond to 
DV victims’ requests for help. Given this tremendous change in the 
criminal justice system’s approach, it is difficult to argue against the 
current regime. This is the problem of “transition.” As stated by 
Littleton: 
To ask society—and especially to ask the law—to take [women’s] 
love and hope seriously is to run headlong into the problem of 
transition. How could we possibly take seriously women’s accounts 
of love and hope without undermining the little protection from 
male violence women have been able to wrest from the legal 
system, without indeed increasing our already overwhelming 
vulnerability?393 
 
 389. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 165, at 17. 
 390. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 11, at 1687 (“[E]ven those [opponents of mandatory 
policies] advocating this position do not want to abandon the benefits of having the potential 
intervention of the criminal justice system available as a realistic threat to batterers. Battered 
women’s advocates, with good reason, also do not want to abandon the conception of 
domestic violence as a public problem.”); id. at 1690 (“[D]o proponents of this discretionary 
structure really believe that without mandatory policies in place, the criminal justice system 
would make the ‘right’ choices and adhere to victims’ desires to treat domestic violence 
seriously (when they wanted them to)?” (citation omitted)); see also Hanna, supra note 34, at 
1863 (discussing threat of giving up ground gained). 
 391. McMahon & Pence, supra note 161, at 61 (“How, one might ask, can the anti-
domestic violence movement be reflective and self-critical about their analysis of battering and 
the role of criminalization without demeaning or devaluing the integrity of activists’ work or 
their accomplishments over the last 30 years?”); Sack, supra note 11, at 1688; see also Hanna, 
supra note 34, at 1863 (discussing giving up the ground gained). 
 392. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 393. Littleton, supra note 11, at 47. 
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Yet if feminist legal scholars value women’s experiences394—and 
particularly if they value women’s desire for connection, in addition 
to women’s desire for safety—they must ask the law to take these 
desires seriously. No-drop prosecution policies are effective for some 
victims—for those who have the resources and the desire to leave 
their partners.395 But what about everyone else?396 
There are choices between current no-drop policies and the 
“always-drop” policies of the past.397 Solutions proposed by Epstein 
and Ford398 demonstrate that there is room to maneuver to take 
advantage of an aggressive prosecutorial strategy while 
simultaneously being sensitive and responsive to the relational 
context.399   
While the problem of transition in the context of prosecutorial 
policy is a difficult one, recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions have made it difficult to ignore.400 These cases substantially 
limit a prosecutor’s use of a victim’s out of court statements, to the 
extent that a criminal defendant did not have the opportunity to 
cross-examine the statements.401 Tuerkheimer describes the cases as 
“throwing-off” and “retrenching” victimless prosecution.402 If 
proceeding without the victim is now more difficult for prosecutors, 
yet the pressure remains to prosecute DV at the same rate as stranger 
 
 394. See discussion infra Part V.B.3. 
 395. SCHECHTER, supra note 70, at 7–8. 
 396. Id. (“Current solutions to domestic violence offer tremendous help and important 
options to women who have resources and who want to leave their partners or end their 
relationships . . . . But what about everyone else?”). 
 397. Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 496; Coker, supra note 98, at 843–44 (arguing 
that a solution need not pose so stark of a dilemma). 
 398. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2 (describing Epstein’s, Coker’s, and Ford’s 
proposals). 
 399. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 329 (2008) (“Ultimately, the argument is not as simple as whether or not to adopt, 
or advocate for, a no-drop prosecution policy. No-drop policies are in reality an amalgam of 
policies and practices which together dictate how prosecutors will pursue domestic violence 
cases. Within this mix there is plenty of room to maneuver in an attempt to reap the 
advantages of the no-drop strategy, without putting victims of domestic violence in greater 
danger of private abuse, or making them newly vulnerable to abuse at the hands of the state.”).  
 400. I refer here to the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions: Giles v. 
California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 810 (2006), and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana, 514 U.S. 
1213 (2006). 
 401. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.  
 402. Tuerkheimer, supra note 14 (describing Crawford v. Davis as throwing-off 
victimless prosecution and Giles v. California as retrenching it).  
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violence,403 it is foreseeable that prosecutorial policies might veer 
toward more, rather than less, coercive measures to procure the 
victim’s testimony at trial.404  
Prior to these decisions, prosecutors subpoenaed victims to 
testify,405 held them in contempt,406 and, in some jurisdictions, 
incarcerated them for failing to appear.407 Some DV scholars who 
support aggressive prosecution have done so on the condition that a 
prosecutor’s ability to use coercive measures to obtain victim 
cooperation should be limited.408 To the extent that their support of 
no-drop policies hinges on the implementation of non-coercive 
measures, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause decisions 
suggest a careful reconsideration of that position. 
B. The Opportunity 
The application of several foundational tenets of RCT to the 
prosecution of DV provides a second opportunity: to implement 
feminist values through policy. RCT normalizes, rather than 
pathologizes, the desire to preserve relationships. It understands that 
liberal notions of autonomy, upon which both contract and DV law 
are built, do not account for the web of interdependencies that are 
the reality of life. RCT values people’s actual experiences in the 
 
 403. See discussion supra Part II.A. (describing the demands of battered women’s activists 
for the state to prosecute DV at the same rate and in the same manner as stranger violence). 
 404. Indeed, prosecutors have begun conducting what Deborah Tuerkeimer refers to as 
“Giles hearings,” in which they attempt to prove two things: that the defendant’s intimidation 
of, or tampering with, the victim has caused her unavailability at trial, and that they have made 
diligent efforts to procure the victim to testify at trial. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 14 
(discussing these pre-trial hearings in Queens County, New York, and describing Queens 
County as “leading the nation” on this issue and training prosecutors in other jurisdictions to 
conduct such hearings); see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of 
“Domestic Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 723 (2009) (describing “Giles 
hearings”).  
 405. Hanna, supra note 34, at 1863 (describing the routine practice in some “hard” drop 
jurisdictions of routinely issuing a subpoena for the victim to appear). 
 406. Id. at 1865–66 (describing this practice generally, and the particular case of Maudie 
Wall as an example). 
 407. See Corsilles, supra note 89, at 876 (describing sanctions including jail); Carol 
Demare, Victim Jailed for Own Safety, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 13, 2003, at B5; 
John Riley, Spouse Abuse Victim Jailed After No-Drop Policy Invoked, NAT’L L.J. Aug. 22, 
1983, at 4. 
 408. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 11, at 1722 (arguing for “the adoption of clear policies 
that limit the use of the criminal justice system to coerce or punish victims” to support her 
contention that no-drop policies not be abandoned). 
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world, and holds that law should reflect this. Feminist legal scholars 
writing in the area of DV have long argued that these values should 
inform law and policy. 
1. Normalizing the need or desire to preserve a relationship 
Both law and society expect women who are victims of DV to 
leave their intimate partners.409 Women who do not leave are 
considered weak, helpless, incapacitated, and crazy.410 This is true 
despite the fact that leaving is in many instances much more 
dangerous than staying,411 that preserving relationships is valued by 
law and lauded by society outside of the context of DV,412 and that 
women—particularly mothers—are expected to preserve the sanctity 
of the family.413 
RCT describes in extensive detail the reasons why people 
involved in exchanges value preserving their relationships, not only 
with each other but with the many others who affect, and are 
affected by, the parties’ exchange.414 Even in relationships that 
appear to be of a purely business nature, such as a 
franchisee/franchisor relationship, preserving the relationship 
matters. And even in relationships that involve power imbalances and 
exploitation, the less powerful party may value preservation of the 
relation; this may be a rational response to the best of a bad set of 
available options.415 In short, RCT is a legal approach that 
normalizes “staying.”  
2. Contextualizing 
Not all victims are the same, not all relationships are the same, 
and not all domestic violence is the same.416 The latter is especially 
 
 409. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 410. See supra notes 86, 364–65 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 416. See generally, e.g., Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: Symmetry and 
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, in COUPLES IN CONFLICT 95 (Alan Booth et al. eds., 2001) 
(distinguishing between “patriarchal terrorism,” which is ongoing violence in the context of 
coercion and control, and “common couple violence,” which are discrete acts of violence that 
exist outside of a context of coercion and control).  
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true when the violence is perpetrated by a victim against her abusive 
partner.417 Yet the current criminal justice system response provides a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to DV.418 If there is sufficient evidence 
to prove a violation of the criminal law, a prosecution should 
proceed, and the victim and perpetrator should be separated.  
RCT is anathema to such an approach. It is “contextual with a 
vengeance.”419 It requires an extensive examination of the facts of a 
given exchange, seen through the internal and external norms 
particular to that exchange, to suggest what result the law ought to 
reach.420 
3. Reflecting people’s actual experiences 
Feminist jurisprudence places a premium on the importance of 
law grounded in the reality of parties’ actual experiences.421 In fact, 
the idea that policy makers must listen to and believe what women 
say has been described as the “methodological secret” of 
feminism.422 Feminist jurisprudence “critiques and seeks to remedy 
the lack of empirical inquiry into contexts that lie outside the 
mainstream, such as the actual conditions of women’s lives.”423  
 
 417. See discussion supra Part III.B.  
 418. MADDEN DEMPSEY, supra note 36, at 27–31 (arguing that the predominant theme 
in the literature is to confine, structure, and check prosecutorial discretion, but that a general 
rule does not assist a prosecutor, so positive laws which attempt to mandate a one-size-fits-all 
approach are unlikely to be justifiable); see also Hanna, supra note 95, at 94 (“We should 
always rethink our strategies and avoid one-size-fits-all approaches. The criminalization of 
domestic violence is still in its infancy, and we have much to learn about what works best and 
for whom.”); Miccio, supra note 19, at 305 (describing the predominant, or “protagonist” 
ideology underlying the current criminal justice system approach as emphasizing the need for 
victims to leave their relationships as a deeply problematic one-size-fits-all approach); Nancy 
Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread Conference on Domestic Violence and 
Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 456 (2008) (“In many jurisdictions domestic violence 
cases, identified principally by evidence of physical violence, are handled on a one-size-fits-all 
basis.”). 
 419. Feinman, supra note 123, at 742. 
 420. Id. at 743. 
 421. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 71–73 (discussing the importance of accounting for 
women’s particular experiences when crafting law and policy). See generally Linda C. McClain, 
Toward a Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 
1225–32 (2000) (describing feminist empiricism). 
 422. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 5 (1987).  
 423. Susan Bandes, What’s Love Got to Do with It?, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 97, 
97–98 (2002). 
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Macneil has been described as leading the way into the “‘swamp’ 
of law-on-the-ground” by his insistence on examining social context 
and the “messy relational clutter that so often surrounds—and 
indeed defines—human agreements and conflict.”424  
4. Critiquing liberal notions of autonomy 
Feminist legal scholars have long argued that the promise of an 
autonomous, liberal self—disconnected from an analysis of relations 
with others—does not work for women.425 Especially for women 
who are mothers.426 
 
 424. Mertz, supra note 106, at 909–10. 
 425. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 9 (2004) (arguing that conceptions of autonomy are “mired in a simplistic 
rhetoric of individual responsibility”); id. at 28 (stating that independence is “neither desirable 
nor possible because of the webs of economic and social relationships that sustain” women); 
Bandes, supra note 423, at 103 (“The autonomy women value might be one that allows them 
to choose love and connection.”); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, 
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989) (“If we ask ourselves what 
actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but relationships . . . .”); 
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of 
Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 211 (2000) (arguing that the goals that 
both liberal and radical feminists “seek—increased freedom and increased equality, 
respectively—are surely intended to benefit . . . the well-being of autonomous creatures. These 
goals will simply not serve women, if women are not ‘autonomous.’”); Robin West, 
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1988) (arguing that traditional notions 
of autonomy are based on a view of individuals as “‘distinct and not essentially connected with 
one another’” (quoting Naomi Scheman, Individualsim and the Objects of Psychology, in 
DISCOVERING REALITY 225, 237 (Sandra Harding et al. eds., 1983))); id. at 3 (“[P]erhaps the 
central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has been that women are ‘essentially 
connected,’ not ‘essentially separate’ . . . .”). See generally MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, 
GENDER, POLITICS 81–112 (2003); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 18 (2006) 
(referring to relational autonomy); Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy and the 
Subjection of Women: Discourses of Social Advocacy at Century’s End, in RELATIONAL 
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 181 
(Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); Abrams, supra note 189; Linda C. 
McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992).  
 426. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, 
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1023–24 (1989) (describing how women in families 
might prefer autonomy that recognizes the web of love and duty binding them to their 
children); Mahoney, supra note 66, at 19 (“One of the most pervasive fictions in the case law 
is that women with children are individual actors. . . . In fact, mothers continually make 
decisions on the basis of extended, collective, multiple self-interest (their children’s as well as 
their own, their husbands’ as well as their children’s).”); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 
supra note 423, at 40 (1988). See generally Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST 
STUD. 342 (1982).  
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In the context of DV, many argue that the law’s presumption 
that victims can and should leave their intimate partners “assumes—
pretends—the autonomy of women. Every legal case that discusses 
the question ‘why didn’t she leave?’ implies that the woman could 
have left.”427 Sally Engle Merry observed that the promise of “liberal 
legalism[—]a self protected by legal rights, able to make 
autonomous decisions”428—only delivers if she is willing to sever her 
relationship and does not need money from her partner or the 
support of her family and community.429 
Kathryn Baker describes another problem with the liberal ideal of 
an autonomous self. Drawing on the work of Robin West,430 she 
argues that liberal feminism is based on a faulty assumption—that if 
fully autonomous, a woman would choose to leave a violent intimate 
relationship rather than preserve it.431 This idea of autonomy—reified 
by liberal feminists—discounts the fact that many victims, like all 
human beings, want to be involved in intimate relationships.432 
Liberal ideals of autonomy, choice, and freedom do not effectively 
speak to feelings of interdependence, bonding, and love.433 The 
response of liberal feminists, Baker argues, has “been to deny that 
women are different from men with regard to relationship and 
autonomy.”434 Advocating for liberal notions of autonomy has in 
turn led courts and society generally to ask the wrong question; 
instead of asking “why didn’t she leave” they should be asking “why 
does he do this?”435 If relationship, rather than autonomy, was the 
 
 427. Mahoney, supra note 66, at 64. 
 428. Merry, supra note 52, at 300. 
 429. Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
11, 19–20 (1995); see also Mahoney, supra note 66, at 20 (“When women tell the stories of 
their commitment to relationships, stories which may include love and hope, the legal system 
often has no way to hear them.”). 
 430. Baker, supra note 81, at 1475–76 & n.82 (citing Robin West, supra note 425, at 
210, for the proposition that the need and desire for relationships is particularly powerful in 
women and that regardless of the “quest for relationship[s] is biologically driven and different 
from men’s because of women’s biological difference, the fact is that many women and 
arguably all caretakers have very powerful needs for relationship”). 
 431. Id. at 1473–80. 
 432. Id. at 1475 (“To address the problem of domestic violence, feminism must address 
what relationships are and how they operate. It cannot simply adopt the liberal reification of 
autonomy and thereby discount the positive potential of and desire for relationships.”). 
 433. Id. at 1474. 
 434. Id. at 1476. 
 435. Id. at 1477–78 & n.89. 
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ideal, the abnormality would be the person who destroys the 
relationship, not the person who values it.436  
Macneil argued that when contracts are treated as discrete and 
relational values are not considered, it is not because the values do 
not exist, but because they are ignored.437 When they are ignored, 
the analysis fails to acknowledge that we do not live in “the world of 
the rights-bearing, autonomous individual” but in a “world where 
every person is inextricably bound to others by a complex web of 
interdependencies and relations.”438 As stated by Macneil: 
“[M]ainstream liberal thinking avoids the existence of relations like 
the plague, because the concept of relation . . . is anathema to the 
individualism upon which liberalism is based.”439  
VI. CONCLUSION 
RCT, as applied to DV cases, asks us to think seriously about the 
multiple and complex relations that affect a victim’s decision to 
support the prosecution of her partner, and about the impact that 
these relations have on the wisdom of the current legal regime’s 
solution to DV. It teaches that the relations and their impact are far 
more significant than current prosecutorial policy, and the scholars 
who seek to reform it, have yet contemplated. RCT provides a 
method for analyzing the impact of relational values. It first suggests 
that we conceive of the intimate relationship as an exchange; by so 
doing, we bring into focus all that the victim gains from, and has to 
lose by terminating, that relation. As a result, our view more closely 
resembles the way victims themselves see their relationships, and the 
way they see the violence that occurs within them. RCT then asks 
that we explain how the impact of those relations has been 
adequately considered. To date, feminist legal scholars and policy-
makers have not sufficiently done so. Now, particularly given the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Giles, it is timely to reconsider the 
wisdom of treating DV as an episode of violence between strangers. 
RCT frees us of the limitations of this transactional thinking. 
 
 
 436. Id. at 1478. 
 437. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 438. James Cassels, Book Review, 27 MCGILL L.J. 591, 602 (1982).  
 439. Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5, 
21 (1984). 
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APPENDIX 
State Jurisdiction Policy Statement Location
AK N/A “[I]t is the prosecutor’s policy that 
once charges have been accepted 
for prosecution, the case should be 
prosecuted despite reluctance by 
the victim.” 
Alaska Network on DV & SA 
Legal Advocacy Project, 
Working Together for 
Justice, Ch. 7, Sec. II 
AL N/A “Prosecution offices should 
develop policies which emphasize 
the State’s authority in case 
decisions. . . . One strategy for 
accomplishing this goal is to 
develop ‘no drop’ policies.” 
 
Guidelines for Prosecution of 








“[T]he Springdale City Attorney’s 
Office . . .will not allow victims to 






AZ Scottsdale Only reference is to “systems 
approach” and “vertical 
prosecution” 




“The District Attorney’s Office 
fully prosecutes incidents of 











CA AG’s Office Provides program grants for 




CO Denver “Denver has a no drop policy on 








CT New Haven “Multi-disciplinary response” 
“The unit has built strong cases 
without relying solely on victim 
testimony.” 
United States Conference of 
Mayors, 1999 
FL N/A “The state attorney in each circuit 
shall adopt a pro-prosecution 
policy for acts of domestic 
violence.” 
FLSA 741.2901 
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:13 PM 





“The Solicitor-General’s Office 
feels these are serious matters and 
vigorously pursues the prosecution 
of such cases. . . . It is the goal of 
this office to stop the violence, not 




HI City of 
Maui 
“The prosecutors have. . .adopted 
a ‘no drop’ policy, whereby a 
victim cannot simply drop charges 
against the abuser.” 




“Prosecutors now pursue charges 
whenever they think they can get a 
conviction using evidence - no 
matter what the victim wants.” 
Idaho Falls Post Register, 






“[T]he State’s Attorney’s Office 
will not drop a case of domestic 







“As Prosecutor, Mr. Brizzi takes 
pro-active steps to protect victims 
of domestic violence . . . by 
aggressively and consistently 
prosecuting domestic batterers and 








“The decision whether to 
prosecute rests solely within the 
discretion of the District 
Attorney. . . .” 
Guidelines for the 






“We operate on a ‘no-drop’ policy 




MA Cape and 
Islands DA’s 
Offie 
“The Cape and Islands District 
Attorney’s Office Domestic 
Violence Unit is committed to the 
aggressive vertical prosecution of 






“Pro-prosecution policy” http:// ccgovernment.carr. 
org/ccg/stateatt/ 
dvunit.htm 
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“The Prosecutor’s office should 
continue the no drop policy 
regarding domestic violence 
cases.” 
Macomb County Domestic 
Violence Fatality Review 






The Joint Domestic Abuse 
Prosecution Unit “prosecut[es] all 
levels of domestic assault and 







“If the partner, spouse, or family 
member wants to stop the cycle of 
violence, they must be willing to 
stand their ground so that the 
suspect will change or they leave 
the suspect before someone really 
gets hurt. . . . We hope if victims 
will not prosecute for themselves 




MT MT Dept of 
Justice 
“The State of Montana must 
ensure that domestic violence is 
prosecuted aggressively and 
effectively.” 
http://www.doj.mt.gov/vict
ims/ domesticviolence. asp 
NE Douglas 
County 
“It is the position, in Douglas 
County, that the aggressive 
prosecution of domestic violence is 
a necessity in order to protect 






NH N/A “The decision whether to file 
charges and which crimes to 
charge is solely the responsibility 
of the prosecutor. . . . As a general 
rule, when a factual basis exists and 
there is some corroboration, 
charges should be filed.” 
Governor’s Commission on 
DV, Prosecution: Domestic 
Violence Protocol, p 4-5 
NV  “The burden of prosecuting 
domestic violence cases should be 
placed on the prosecutor and not 
the victim. Prosecutors should 
always . . . be prepared for an 
evidence-based prosecution . . . .” 
Domestic Violence 
Prosecution Best Practice 
Guidelines, State of Nevada 
Advisory Council for 
Prosecuting Attorneys, p.4 
NY  “The input of victims should be 
considered when making 
enforcement and prosecutorial 
decisions, but responding to the 
presenting needs of victims need 
not interfere with law 
enforcement’s primary goal - to 
enforce the law.” 
 
Criminal Justice, Legal, and 
Judicial Systems Model 
Domestic Violence Policy for 
Counties, NY Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic 
Violence, 2008, p.2 
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“With victim safety as our primary 
goal, the success of the Domestic 
Violence Prosecution Unit will not 
be measured by the number of 
convictions. The new unit . . . 
[will] focus[] on improvement in 
. . .: Ensuring cases are not 
withdrawn or dropped simply due 




RI AG’s Office “[T]he Unit . . . has implemented 




UT Salt Lake 
County 
DV team has increased 
prosecution rates and decreased 
dismissal rates by “being more 















law/ domestic-violence. php 
WA Seattle “Prosecutors will continue to 
make the decision as to when to 
prosecute a case and will promote 
public awareness that domestic 
violence is not acceptable in our 
society. . . . There is no ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to domestic 
violence prosecution that will work 
in every case.” 
City of Seattle, 2005-2009 
Strategic Plan on Seattle’s 
Criminal Justice Response to 
Domestic Violence, Sept. 5, 
2005, p. 56 
WI WI Dept of 
Justice 
“Proceed with prosecution unless 
the case cannot be proven; the 
decision to prosecute is based on 
evidence, not on the cooperation 
of the victim.” 
Model Domestic Violence 
Policies and Procedures, 
Wisconsin Dept of Justice, 
Wisconsin Crime Victims 




“With the Kanawha County 
Prosecutors office that established 
a ‘no drop’ policy for abuse cases 
this crime will be prosecuted and 
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